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1. About The Universal
Human Rights as a scholarly endeavor has, in recent years, generated interest across a variety of
academic disciplines, such as history, law, political philosophy, ethics, international relations and
sociology. The historical trend however, has been to separate such fields into mutually exclusive ap-
proaches and perspectives that perpetuate academic cloistering. In addition, there exists a tendency
for high quality student and graduate research to go unnoticed and unpublished. Consequently, new
avenues for the distribution of integrative ideas and approaches originating from a range of scholars
are required.
Think Rights seeks to meet these demands by publishing the Universal, a peer reviewed journal
devoted to interdisciplinary research on human rights issues. One of its foremost objectives is to
provide a platform from which students (BA, MA and Ph.D.), recent graduates, and researchers can
publish high quality research from an array of academic backgrounds and experiences. Essentially,
by inviting students to an inter-disciplinary inter-university debate on human rights, we hope to




Human Rights Challenges in a Transforming Europe
Perspectives from Then and Now
Human rights do not come natural to Europe. We may have been led to believe so after decades of
experience that seemed to affirm this connection. The important role that human rights played for
the peaceful end of the Cold War in Europe following the adoption of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act
by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and in the European reunification
process after the fall of Communism in 1989 helped make human rights central to modern European
life and politics.
In the 1990s, the European Union declared human rights to be part of European values. It
was a decade where national, regional and international human rights promotion and protection
witnessed a remarkable expansion both in Europe and globally. This coincided with a new wave
of democratisation that aimed to consolidate the political foundations upon which human rights
protection could flourish. These developments seemed to confirm the principles from the Preamble
of the European Convention on Human Rights from 1950, where the participating states reaffirmed:
“their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of
justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective
political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of
the human rights upon which they depend.”
Human rights and democratization were an integral part of the so-called Copenhagen Criteria for
EU enlargement agreed by its member states in 1993. The criteria established the required political,
legal and administrative types of reform for which the degree of compliance would determine
the Eastern European countries possibility to join the European Union. It was this process that
paved the way for the EU enlargement which from 2004 brought the former Communist states
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membership of the EU. Human rights was by no means empty rhetorics. They were part of a set of
standards and principles that defined what a European state was supposed to be in the post-Cold
War World.
It now appears that this may be changing. Large parts of Europe seem now to be rethinking their
commitment to human rights. Although the European Union itself is still promoting them in both
internal and external relations, they are increasingly being defied by political movements and
parties across the continent, as well as by some Governments in member states. These dynamics
maybe reshaping European politics as we speak, and the critiques and counter-forces are certainly
challenging the legitimacy of the EU itself. The question then beckons: Can the centre hold?
We may need to ask ourselves whether the political traditions and democratic foundations in Europe
are strong enough to withstand the assertive attempts to undermine human rights, the rule of law
and democracy across the continent. Time will tell, but it is fair to ask: Is the jury not out on this?
If there is doubt about the outcome here, it is then necessary for us to ask once again one of the
questions that the generation tasked with the political, economic, social and cultural rebuilding of
Europe after the barbarism, atrocities and utter devastation caused by the Second World War asked
themselves: How natural are human rights to Europe?
The Council of Europe, the European Human Rights Convention and a European Court of Human
Rights were significant responses that showed that this was answered in the affirmative. The same
goes for the integration of human rights into post-war national constitutions such as the German
Grundgesetz from 1949 that made human dignity a founding value for the new West German
Federal Republic1. But there was more to the early post-war European responses to human rights
than meets the eye. This “more” was connected to how Europe interacted with the rest of the world
– just like the modern-day challenges to human rights have an important basis in contestations over
Europe’s interactions with the wider world. Globalization was also a factor back then but in a very
different historical shape and form.
Soon after the Second World War ended, the Cold War emerged, led by the two dominant super-
powers – the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe became divided with an “Iron curtain”
based on the political and ideological fault-lines that defined this conflict. However, at this stage
Europe’s main interactions with the world were still linked to the colonial territories controlled
by the West European states of France, United Kingdom, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands,
encompassing large parts of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. This geo-political reality greatly
influenced international human rights in the first decades after 1945, and also determined European
positions regarding the legal nature and reach of human rights
A significant part of the human rights literature and thinking sees the historical emergence of
international human rights from the 1948 Universal Declaration to the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989 from the East-West perspective. However, for a more representative understanding and fuller
appreciation of this history, it is more than overdue to “take off the Cold War lens” and understand
the profound importance of the North-South dimension and how this interacted with the East-West
competition and struggle for power2. This approach places the global history of human rights and
Europe’s place in it in a rather different light.
1Samuel Moyn (2015), Christian Human Rights, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, p. 96.
2Matthew Connelly (2000), “Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict During the Algerian
War for Independence”, American Historical Review, vol. 105, no. 3, p. 739-769.
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a response to the 1945 UN Charter that made hu-
man rights a “Purpose” and “Vision” for the work of the United Nations. At the same time, the UN
Charter affirmed state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction. This was a powerful counter-weight to
the universal claims of human rights. These claims were curtailed, as the Universal Declaration was
by very deliberate design not a legally binding document. In contrast, The European Convention on
Human Rights from 1950 was legally binding for the states ratifying states, but its reach was limited
to the Western European states plus Turkey and Greece, that were members of the Council of Europe.
This limited legal scope had its reasons. The Council of Europe and the Convention were legal and
political means to assert democracy and the rule of law in Europe against the Soviet-controlled
dictatorships in Eastern Europe. But concerns over the limited scope and ambitions for human
rights protection and guarantees were also expressed during the ratification debates in national
parliaments. What did the European Convention’s legal standards mean for the colonial subjects in
the European colonies? How would the legitimate claims for equal rights and freedom be addressed
in the non-Western world?
This concern was addressed, for example, during the debate in the Danish Parliament on the
ratification of the European Convention in December 1952 - where the spokesperson for the Social
Democratic Party expressed his concerns in the following manner:
“I regret the solution that has been reached because maybe the largest transformation
in world history is not the rise and fall of Hitler, and maybe not the creation of the
expansive Soviet empire, but instead what, ignored by many, happens in these years,
namely that the colored population around the world are having an awakening and are
demanding freedom and equal rights. When everything is said, they form well over
half the population of the world. Seen through the eyes of a democrat it is one of the
most joyous developments in the world, but if one does not feel the human solidarity
with all of them, who with the same right speak up about human rights, there is reason
to be clear that there is also a political danger from this. . . . There is reason for the
white world to include the colored in all of our efforts for human rights, there is reason
to ensure that one can never justifiably say, that we are talking about human rights but
we actually mean white man’s rights.” 3
There are echoes from here that we may be hearing again in today’s world, despite the fact that
an international legal system has developed in the intervening decades. This evolution, which
took off from the 1960’s, did help Europe develop towards more universally oriented human rights
commitments. The driver of this trend was to a very large extent the decolonization process that
in the 1950s, 1960s and into the 1970s transformed the international system of states and the
foundations on which international law, politics and diplomacy were based. It was to a surprising
and remarkable extent a group of key countries from the Global South that led and consolidated
this breakthrough – especially through the United Nations – and influenced European politics and
values in the process4. The decolonization process in the mid-20th century has been described as
the largest transfer of sovereign power in world history with a profound impact on Europe as well
or as Jan Werner-Müller has put it: “Decolonization was a precondition that ‘Europe’ might again
be associated with and worthy of an egalitarian universalism.”5 It was from this political reality that
3Frode Jakobsen (Social Democratic Party), Rigsdagstidende, 104. ordentlige samling 1952-1953, Forhandlinger i
Folketinget, Bind I, 3 December 1952, sp. 1400. Emphasis added.
4Steven L. B. Jensen (2016), The Making of International Human Rights. The 1960s, Decolonization and the
Reconstruction of Global Values. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
5Jan Werner-Müller (2010), Contesting Democracy. Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe. Yale University
Press, New Haven, CT, p. 157.
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human rights came to play an increased role in European politics from the 1970s as sketched above.
The political results and changes over the ensuing decades speak for themselves.
However, it now appears that Europe is at a crossroads in its commitment to international human
rights. Austerity politics, populist movements and the refugee and migrant crisis have accelerated
the criticism of both human rights and the European Union. Europe will need to find new answers to
the questions surrounding its commitment to both values and political cooperation and integration.
The articles in this volume of The Universal address exactly these issues. They cover a diverse
range of topics reflecting the challenges and responses faced by Europe today. From Bosnia to
France, and from the migrants’ life in a Danish deportation center to the status and practice of the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, this volume offers glimpses into the realities of
displaced people, national and ethnic challenges in post-conflict societies as well as into institu-
tional responses to these crises at a continent-wide level. Human rights matter, and currently face
challenges, at all these levels.
The first article “A Life of Temporariness” approaches the reality of male asylum seekers whose
permission to stay in Denmark was rejected, and live therefore in the deportation center Sjælsmark
north of Copenhagen. This field study presents their experiences, which speak to a larger phe-
nomenon increasingly faced in European countries after 2015. The increase in human displacement
implies a great variety of categories from asylum seekers, refugees, migrants, rejected asylum
seekers to undocumented migrants - with many of them facing legal limbo. The situation has
revived the old claim by the German philosopher Hannah Arendt from her famous book The Origins
of Totalitarianism from 1951 about “the right to have rights”. For Arendt this was a foundational
claim. Today, when raised, this phrase increasingly comes with a question mark at the end: Do
people still have the rights to have rights? The persons in question live with their lives in suspension,
seeking community but not in legal terms regarded as belonging to a political community in the
way that Arendt envisaged. The life in temporariness that the authors capture serve as an illustration
that we may be producing new forms of statelessness – a problem that was at the heart of the
post-Second World War attempts to build an international legal regime that addressed displacement,
forced expulsions, crimes against humanity, refugee flows by trying to establish and regulate rules
for asylum as well as reducing statelessness through domestic application of international law.
The subjects addressed in the field study have “experienced too many disappointments to dare to
dream”, the article explains, and it is unsure when the temporariness of their existence will end and
what type of solution this will entail.
The second article addresses the long aftermath since the most traumatic European event in the
1990s. While the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe was largely peaceful, the disintegration of
Yugoslavia was the great exception. The Civil War in Bosnia resulted in genocide, ethnic cleansing,
crimes against humanity, mass displacement and large refugee numbers. The multi-year siege of
Sarajevo by Serbian forces resonated deeply around Europe as it was in the same city in which
the assassination of the Austrian-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist
took place in 1914. That event set in motion the succeeding events that led to the outbreak of the
First World War and served as the spark that enflamed what the Italian historian Enzo Traverso has
called “the European Civil War” from 1914-19456.
Europe looked powerless when faced with the Bosnian conflict in the 1990s. The war was
only brought to an end in 1995 with the Dayton Peace Accords. The article “The Post-Dayton
Dilemma: Examining Inherent Human Rights Contradictions in the Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina” tells the story of the consequences of this peace agreement (that certainly ended
6Enzo Traverso (2016), Fire and Blood: The European Civil War, 1914-1945. Verso Books, London.
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the violence) but also froze the ethnic divisions into an administrative and constitutional order
from which much needed reform seems insurmountable to achieve. As the authors note, “the
dysfunctional system of ethnic segregation and political deadlock that resulted from the Dayton
Agreement, offered a short-term solution instead of a long-term resolution to the problems that
plagued Bosnia-Herzegovina at the war’s end.” The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina con-
tained excellent human rights provisions while at the same time, it included other provisions that
went against these by emphasizing the rights of the three different “constituent peoples” along
ethno-national lines. What was articulated as ideals of inclusion have proved to instead enforce
forms of exclusion. Like the individuals in the Danish deportation center, the political entity of
Bosnia and Herzegovina seem to be confined to a permanent limbo.
The third article shifts attention to one of the main battlegrounds in the debates over the status of
human rights in Europe – namely the European Court of Human Rights and its so-called “dynamic
interpretation.” The Court has gained increased attention in recent years. In Great Britain there
have been calls to withdraw from the system by prominent politicians such as Theresa May (at least
before she became Prime Minister in 2016) and Denmark’s chairmanship of The Council of Europe
that started in November 2017 had as a declared goal to challenge the Court’s alleged activism and
practice of dynamic interpretation.
This is therefore another timely article. It illustrates well that the Court’s practice and the jurispru-
dence emerging from it is argued in a more nuanced way than its political and academic critics allow
for. The article looks at the European Court’s interpretation tradition and related legal principles
such as the “margin of appreciation”, “subsidiarity” and the “emerging consensus doctrine”. It
offers an antidote to the criticisms directed against the Court. Amongst the different critiques, the
authors remark the arguments that claim that the Court is an “inherently non-democratic institu-
tion, because the judges are not democratically elected, and the ECtHR has the power to declare
democratically created policies to be human rights violations.” The response hereto is that this
represents “a reductive understanding of democracy as majoritarian rule” and that individual rights
have been designed exactly to address the pitfalls of this type of rule by allowing some fundamental
protections.
The fourth article shows how European states continue to take proactive steps to promote and
protect human rights. The article “Advancing Human Rights in Global Value Chains: The French
Legislation on Corporate Duty of Vigilance” focuses on two complex areas of human rights:
regulating businesses and their practices, and the link to the question of extra-territorial obligations.
Traditionally, human rights have prescribed relations between an individual (the rights-holder) and
the state (the duty-bearer) but the power of businesses especially multi-national corporations have
changed the dynamic of human rights violations and the need for protection. The problem, however,
has been that international law concerns states and does not directly involve businesses. There have
been various attempts to expand human rights to the business but they have at best been voluntary
and incremental and this has proved insufficient. The other aspect is the extra-territorial obligations
– meaning addressing human rights violations perpetrated by business entities belonging to one
state, but with operations geographically located within the territories of other states. This raises
important questions about the nature of jurisdictions and the regulatory responsibilities by states
for companies either headquartered in their country or operating in a given country but legally
positioned and operating from overseas. There is a lot at stake in the regulation of this area. The
article describes France’s attempt at legislating obligations for a “corporate duty of vigilance”
to avoid disasters such as the one at the Rana Plaza Building in Bangladesh in 2013 (where a
garments factory collapsed costing the lives of thousands of workers and leaving victims without
compensation). The French law shows that expansion of human rights are still ongoing despite
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all the counterforces trying to limit their scope, reach and the holding to account of governments
and others for their actions, their policies, their laws, their violations and their discrimination of
individuals. It shows that human rights are very much still a factor in European politics even though
they find themselves in 2018 at the complicated and uncertain fault-lines of European and global
politics.
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3. A Life of Temporariness
NIKITA HOSSEINI, JOSEPHINE AMANDA JØRGENSEN, NADIA CHARLOTTE DAHLGREN
PETERSEN, NICOLINE PORS
A Life of Temporariness
Abstract
This article will focus on rejected male asylum seekers, who live in the deportation center Sjælsmark
and find themselves in a temporary condition, where they negotiate their own identities while living
temporary lives. This paper is based on a field study conducted in Denmark over a period of three
months. Through this field study, we have established that our informants live stagnant lives, which
are characterized by uncertain futures combined with having been deprived their legal rights. We
observed that rejected male asylum seekers negotiate their identities through strategies such as
engaging with communities.
Introduction
Kian and I are walking around the big grass field on Deportation Center Sjælsmark.
We walk by the doctor’s office located on the premises. I ask Kian if he has ever gotten
ill while living at the center. Kian replies that he makes sure not to get sick. The only
advice the doctors give is to drink water. He tells me a story about a young man, who
felt physically and mentally ill. He went to the doctor only to be told that he needed to
drink water. Later that evening, the man tried to commit suicide.
This situation took place while conducting fieldwork over a period of three months in Sjælsmark,
a deportation center north of Copenhagen. The meeting with one of our informants, Kian, was
thought-provoking in how we as Danish citizens understand the Danish asylum system as well as
Denmark as a whole.
In the year of 2015 (BBC 2016), there has been an estimate of one million people, among
these migrants and refugees, who have crossed the frontier of Europe. In public discourse, this has
been considered as a threat to the European national states both in political and economic terms.
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Recently in Denmark, an intense debate has emerged concerning asylum seekers and the proposal
of restricted family reunification for refugees. The Danish government’s proposal has been used
as a tool directed towards refugees with the purpose of making it less attractive to seek asylum in
Denmark. The restrictions on the area of asylum such as family reunification and integration have
been criticized by the United Nations for being deeply concerning (UNHCR 2016: 2).
But how does it feel to be the object of all these debates and political strategies? Our interest in
this question led us to commence research regarding refugees in Denmark (See: Hosseini et al 2016).
Anthropological fieldwork
We decided to conduct fieldwork and participant observations. We believe it is important to show
the field of observation and the refugees respect. Hence, we did not want to impose ourselves onto
the informants, inasmuch as we wanted to gain their trust and respect. Most of the informants speak
Farsi and in view of this, one of the members of our research group played a crucial part in the
preliminary contact because of her Iranian heritage and her comprehension of the Farsi language.
We found inspiration in different methodological tools during our fieldwork. For instance,
walking and object probes, which entail using specific objects like places or musical works, which
we encountered with our informants in order to steer the conversation (De Leon & Cohen 2005).
E.g. our informants showed us pictures from their lives in their home countries, which we could
use to start conversations about specific topics, we wanted to uncover. Additionally, we used grand
tour questions when we asked them to describe certain events or activities, so as to give us a better
understanding of these (Spradley 1979). For instance, we asked an excessive amount of questions to
Milad and Shahin to make them describe in great detail the Thursday practice of receiving financial
support from the authorities. This was to ensure, that we would discover all the small but sometimes
important nuances of a practice like this.
We spent time contemplating our appearance towards our informants with regard to our gender,
social and cultural background so as not to hinder an informal climate of conversation and build
up personal trust. We wanted to level the boundaries between us and our informants by letting
our informants decide the topics of conversation, however, this left us with questions unanswered.
Even so, we determined this to be a suitable way of showing respect and patience towards their
vulnerable conditions as refugees. Later in the process, the bond between us grew thicker and
resulted in a trustful relationship, in which we could deal with sensitive topics.
The majority of our informants are Kurds from Iran, and a few others are from Iraq. They are
all male and between 21-30 years old. They have been in Denmark for approximately one to three
years. Our empirical data has been conducted amongst 20 informants of whom we primarily use
eight.
Gender relations in Kermanshah are different from what we as Danish women are accustomed
to. Like in the work of Jill Dubisch, it is a common belief that male informants from the non-western
world do not share the same ideas as their Western counterparts regarding power relations in gender
and sexual relationships (Dubisch 1995: 34f). Consequently, and to avoid any romantic misinter-
pretations, we set up some “guidelines” on how to appear professionally and friendly. This entailed
a limited amount of eye contact, no physical contact and wearing more covering clothes than we
normally would. Instead of our intentions of creating a safe environment, some of us experienced
how transgressing our guidelines could be misinterpreted as a sexual advance. Therefore, when
meeting the informants, we were especially aware how we were perceived (Groes-Green 2012: 48;
Spradley 1980: 48). Moreover, the issues concerning gender became easier for us to deal with
thanks to our Iranian research member’s insight. On the basis of her cultural heritage, she achieved
a different position than the rest of us. We believe that our informants’ distinct behavior towards her
relied on both researcher and informants sharing the same codes of conduct. The shared cultural
bond resulted in her being referred to as khahar (sister). As evident in research by anthropologist
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Christian Groes-Green, this type of “sibling behavior” between researcher and informant creates a
deeper kind of trust (Groes-Green 2012: 50).
"I have been here too long"
I am sitting on a bench next to Kian. Nørrebro is full of people. People with places to
go. Things to do. Other people to meet. Goals and dreams. We look at these people
in silence. Then I ask him, what he dreams about. What does he want for his future?
He looks at me with empty eyes and states that he has no dreams. I smile at his bleak
answer and ask if he really has no wishes for his future life. “I have been here too long
to still have dreams about my future” he says while looking at the people of Nørrebro.
Kian’s case is not unique. During our fieldwork, we were met with discouraged attitudes wherever
we went. The refugees had experienced too many disappointments to dare to dream. They were
all stuck in this situation, which seemed indefinite. This condition was conceptualized in the book
Et midlertidigt liv: Bosniske flygtninge i de nordiske lande (Schwartz 1998). The sense of tempo-
rariness that the refugees felt, according to anthropologists Susanne Utsigt, Kristina Grünenberg
and Anders Stefansson, to name a few of the contributors to this book, is apparently still prevailing
amongst asylum seekers today. Our informants told us about isolation, stagnation, and the loss of
the right to construct their own daily lives. Their lives are controlled exclusively by authorities
and legislation, which can be very hard to accept (Utsigt 1998: 106; Grünenberg: 1998: 64f). In
the same way, they were all missing a sense of meaning in their lives. Several of the informants
expressed how they would love to continue their studies, but were not allowed to do so. Others
missed their former jobs. One of our informants, Mahmoud, told us that he was afraid that he had
forgotten how to work. He had forgotten how it felt to get up in the morning and have a purpose for
the day. Mahmoud had been without a sense of purpose for the last 14 months.
In addition, this loss of purpose and control over their lives lead to the fear of dreaming, as
expressed by Kian in the field note above. Several of our informants expressed the feeling of
getting old in Denmark. They showed us pictures of themselves before their journey to Europe
in order to prove how young they had looked prior to their encounter with the Danish asylum
apparatus. We interpret their aging as not only physical. Two of our informants, Kian and Danny,
seemed more discouraged than the rest. Kian and Danny’s cases were filled with rejections, and
the cases had subsequently been closed. The pair had been in Denmark longer than the rest
of our informants. Consequently, they have been living a temporary life and dealing with this
condition to a greater extent than the other informants. Their statements were invariably charac-
terized by a greater sense of negativity and despair than the rest of our informants. This tendency
was also recorded in Utsigt’s research. In this context, Utsigt makes the point that there can be
a strong correlation between an asylum seeker’s mood and the status of their case (Utsigt 1998: 91f).
"They kill us mentally"
As evident in previous research, it can be argued that refugee camps are exposed to social exclusion
due to the society’s negative perspective on refugees (Turner 2015: 2f). The asylum seekers are
often perceived as flawed individuals, who disturb the peace and order in the communities. This is
caused by the notion that every race belongs to a certain territory (Stefansson 1998: 181). Hence,
this notion in combination with the conviction that the newcomers’ race is inferior to the majority’s
(De Genova 2014: 6), create a hostile environment, which is precisely what our informants felt on a
daily basis. Their bodies are embedded with national borders as a result of racial classification and
discrimination (De Genova 2014: 6). According to the men we spoke to, this racial barrier was
ever present for both the native Danes and the refugees. They expressed a sense of being treated
differently because of their “foreign” look. Another one of our informants, Omar, was convinced
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that his ethnicity caused native Danes to change their seats on the bus or train if he sat beside them.
In a train filled with blond Danes, he blamed his black hair, which made it impossible to disregard
his distinct appearance. Like Omar, another one of our informants was convinced that his hair color
was the main cause of the poor treatment he received by Danish society. He would point to his
head and state that the color was the only juxtaposing feature. “We are all people,” he would say
resignedly. In addition to a sense of being racially discriminated, our informants felt that life in
the camps robbed them of their dignity. An example of this was that the Danish asylum offices
only knew the refugees by number instead of by name. When informing the refugees about mail
or appointments, their number would appear on a screen. One day we walked by the screen and
Milad, an informant, expressed his discontent with the numbers; “We are not treated as human
beings. Here we are just a number”. Milad’s experience is consistent with earlier findings among
refugees. Consequently, a sense of loss is experienced with regard to one’s selfhood and identity,
and it is often a result of the bureaucratic asylum apparatus (Grünenberg 1998: 63). Hence, there
is a discrepancy between how asylum seekers view themselves, and how their hosting countries
perceive them (Utsigt 1998: 95).
"We were told that Europe cared about human rights"
There is complete silence. Then Milad looks at Nikita and begs her pardon for what he
is about to say. “We risked our lives trying to escape. We were told that Europe cared
about human rights. But that was a lie. We were told that people were free here. But
we are locked up.” Milad looks out in the distance. Without blinking he says: “In our
countries, they kill us physically. Here, they kill us mentally. I don’t know which is
worse.”
Our informants articulated a sense of disappointment towards Danish society. Several of them had
an understanding of Denmark as a country where they would be acknowledged socially and legally
on the same terms as native Danes. However, as asylum seekers in Denmark today, they have
discovered that this understanding is not consistent with reality. This has resulted in a clash between
their notion of Denmark, Danish beliefs and values, and how the Danish state actually operates in
handling refugees. Adjunct Professor of Law at Aarhus University Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen
and Professor of Law James Hathaway emphasize the duality that exists in how Europe articulates
and praises basic human rights for those who flee their countries due to safety issues, while simulta-
neously seeking to keep precisely these individuals out of European territory by way of tightening
the legislations regarding migration and refugees. This is characterized as a schizophrenic Europe
(Hathaway & Gammeltoft 2014: 61).
According to associate professor at the University of Copenhagen, Simon Turner, the refugee
camp has a tendency of stigmatizing individuals living in there as not belonging to society (Turner
2015: 4). Our informants have expressed the same stigmatization by feeling unwanted especially
by being put in these camps. Additionally, we find it paradoxical how asylum seekers are subjected
to the penalty system on equal terms as Danish citizens, but they are not given the same rights in
order to navigate in society. Through conversations with our informants, we sensed how this leads
them to believe that the Danish society is intent on punishing them. Kian told us how they all on a
daily basis get tickets for not having paid for public transportation. Kian and Mahmoud showed us
a huge pile of tickets and told us how the DKK 84, they receive every second week is not nearly
enough for one bus ride back and forth between Copenhagen and Sjælsmark. This story shows how
rejected asylum seekers have limited access into Danish society. Simon Turner emphasizes that
European countries are willing to give asylum seekers food and a roof over their heads, however,
the EU does not expect the asylum seekers to make political demands (Turner 2015: 5).
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Furthermore, our informants have legally entered Danish territory in the hopes of being recog-
nized as asylum seekers on the basis of their sensitive status as politically persecuted individuals
or as refugees of war. As described by Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen, they have the right to
seek asylum and enter the territory, but they are not entitled the right of being acknowledged as
asylum seekers (Hathaway & Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014: 2f). Thus, when the Danish state refuses
to recognize these people as asylum seekers, they will, as evident in the abovementioned, be placed
in a temporary condition without a visible future.
"Yes, everyone is welcome"
I ask Milad when they are having dinner. He replies, “Today I’ll eat maybe at eleven
o’clock”. Milad tells me about a man and nods towards one of the other buildings:
“There is a man in the other building, and he cooks for us”. Milad tells us about Ismail,
who cooks every day: “Is he cooking for the entire camp?” I ask. “Yes, everyone is
welcome.”
We experienced how there seemed to be an overall sense of community amongst the residents
at Sjælsmark, which was based on the shared position our informants had as rejected asylum
seekers. As mentioned earlier, the men experience discrimination due to the categorization, they
are subjected to by way of the ethnic markers embedded on their bodies. It is evident to us that
the refugees construct their own community as a response to the discrimination described by our
informants. Thus, by cooking their own dinner, even though they are not allowed to at Sjælsmark,
the rejected asylum seekers try to regain some sense of control whilst challenging the Danish
asylum system.
As evidenced above, the identities of the rejected asylum seekers are under pressure because
of their position. According to anthropologist Richard Jenkins, identity is social. We constantly
negotiate our identities based on how we perceive ourselves, how other people perceive us, and
how we perceive other people. We position ourselves and others according to which categories and
groups we belong to (Jenkins 2012: 115). Focusing on social identity, we see how our informants
identify themselves based on the following categories. The men hold on to categories like religion
and ethnicity which they have identified with or dissociated themselves from before being placed in
the asylum system. For Kian, religion is very important as this example below indicates. Many
refugees convert to Christianity in their encounter with Danish society. There is a common belief
amongst the refugees that Denmark accepts Christians and rejects Muslims. For Kian however, the
thought of giving up his belief seemed absurd:
Kian and I are walking down Nørrebrogade in Copenhagen. I ask him about his
opinion on an acquainted of ours, who is going to be baptized into the Christian
faith the following weekend. Kian stops. “If the sky should fall down, I would still
not change my religion!” he almost yells. “They can take everything from me, but
nobody can touch my faith.” He looks at me, eyes wide open. I nod to show him my
understanding. “The people who change their religion in hopes of getting asylum has
no self-respect!” he continues and sighs.
Jenkins describes how a group membership can contribute to members of the same community, exag-
gerating similarities internally between themselves and simultaneously exaggerating the differences
between members and non-members outside the community (Jenkins 2012: 115). Furthermore,
cultural differences confirm the individual’s self-ascribed identity, because identity strengthens
in heterogeneity (Utsigt 1998: 98f; Jenkins 2012: 105). Moreover, we noticed how the men to
some extent verbalized the differences between themselves and other rejected asylum seekers
in Sjælsmark when meeting with the informants during the fieldwork. Often, they articulated
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differences like religion, language and ethnicity when talking about the membership of smaller
communities. As indicated above in the field note, this categorization of others as well as distancing
himself from them is a way for Kian to maintain his identity as a Muslim. Likewise, the rejected
asylum seekers formed a community and friendships based on their shared religion. Religion seems
to be of great significance for the men, and we noticed that it could affect how solid a friendship or
a community could become. One of our informants told us that he had formed a friendship with
one of the other men, but he emphasized that they could never become close friends since they had
different religions.
We also observed how notions of ethnicity were a substantial factor in the common sense of a
community. To clarify, we noticed several times how ethnicity became an object of prejudice, and
this was significant in how the rejected asylum seekers behaved towards each other in and outside
the smaller communities. According to Utsigt and Jenkins, prejudice towards different ethnic
origins can be a way of handling various groupings (Utsigt 1998: 99; Jenkins 2012: 115). Often,
we observed the notions of ethnicity as fluid and in connection with nationality. Consequently, the
national and ethnic differences our informants identify with create or sustain a self-image, which is
rooted in different values, qualities and notions (Jenkins 2012: 115).
Conclusion
We have established that our informants live a temporary life characterized by stagnation and
isolation. The Danish authorities control the daily lives of our informants, which is hard for them
to cope with. They long for a meaningful daily routine with a job or an education.
By placing refugees in a camp, they are systematically excluded from the rest of society. Addi-
tionally, our informants felt an exclusion based on their different appearances, which led to a sense
of seclusion from Danish society and Danish citizens.
Another effect the Danish asylum system had on our informants was a sense of identity loss.
Especially the fact that the refugees were called on by numbers instead of names enforced this.
They came to Europe with the hope of finally being recognized and respected as fellow human
beings based on the Human Rights significance in European countries. Instead, they were met
with exclusion from society and no rights at all. Their notion of Europe does not live up to the
reality they experience now. They have no rights and cannot complain with regard to their living
conditions, however, they still have to adhere to Danish legislation as native Danes. They are not
listened to, but they are expected to listen.
In conclusion, to negotiate this temporary condition, our asylum seeker informants create shared
communities, which enable them to push against the power, control, and limitations they have been
subjected to by the Danish authorities. In addition, asylum seekers utilize these communities so as
to sustain and create their own identities, which are based on categories and groups they enter or
consciously do not enter. This enables them to hold on to their sense of self in spite of the pressure
they feel from the Danish asylum system.
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4. The Post-Dayton Dilemma
KENAN SADOVIC, SARAH FREEMAN-WOOLPERT
The Post-Dayton Dilemma: Examining Inherent Human Rights
Contradictions in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina
Abstract
The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, established by Annex 4 of the 1995 Dayton Peace
Accords, directly incorporates elements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights among
numerous other international conventions. International actors, and the American diplomatic effort
to draft the Dayton Accords, prioritized principles of universal human rights in an effort to establish
peace and stability between the country’s three constituent peoples: Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims),
Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats. However, two decades after the signing of the Dayton Accords,
the Bosnian Constitution has been ruled in violation of the European Court of Human Rights due to
its inherent discriminatory elements, which ultimately guarantee human rights to select constituent
groups while excluding minority groups from the full enjoyment of these rights, including the
ability to run for certain political offices such as the country’s tripartite presidency. This article has
three aims: to outline the unique human rights provisions set forth rhetorically within the Bosnian
Constitution; to explore the ways in which human rights are systemically violated in Bosnia and
Herzegovina today; and to provide a scholarly analysis of why the current human rights situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina fails to live up to the language of universal human rights introduced at the
outset of its post-war Constitution.
The Post-Dayton Dilemma
Between 1992 and 1995, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) sent shockwaves across
Europe. Only ten years after Sarajevo hosted the Winter Olympics, and a mere two years after the
reunification of Germany, a conflict erupted in South-Eastern part of Europe. The war that engulfed
the former Yugoslavia was particularly devastating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia’s most
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ethnically diverse republic. The Srebrenica genocide was the single worst humanitarian atrocity
committed in Europe since World War II, and the Siege of Sarajevo was the longest siege of a
capitol city in modern warfare, lasting a total of 1,425 days (Kalyvas & Sambanis 2005).
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began to dissolve in the early 1990s,
following a rise in nationalist sentiment after the death of the Yugoslav President, Josip Broz Tito,
in 1980. After Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, the conflict
quickly spread to neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina. The referendum for independence was
hosted in B&H on March 1, 1992 with 99.7% of the population voting in favour of secession from
Yugoslavia. Not wanting to lend legitimacy to the secession attempt, the referendum was boycotted
by the Bosnian Serbs, who refused to be part of the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
instead formed the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) in August of the same year. The ensuing
conflict lasted over three years and cost nearly 100,000 lives (Ahmetasevic 2007). More than twenty
years after the end of the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina still bears scars from the conflict – from fear
and prejudices that pervade everyday life, to the very structure of the country’s post-war political
system.
This article analyses the ways in which the post-war Constitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina
reflects a rhetorical commitment to universal human rights as promoted by the international
community, which played a central role in the drafting and passage of the Dayton Peace Accords,
of which the Constitution is an Annex. It is necessary to begin by examining the text of the
Constitution and exposing several contradictions inherent within the document. The article then
explores several areas in which human rights remain at-risk or are flagrantly violated in B&H
today, particularly the freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and freedom from discrimination.
Finally, this analysis undertakes a discussion of the factors that hinder protection of human rights in
B&H today, namely the decentralization of the Bosnian political bureaucracy, an over-concentration
of competing organizations in the NGO sector, and widespread corruption and nepotism in both
the public and private sectors. The article concludes by offering recommendations for addressing
the challenges of protecting the human rights of citizens in B&H, and outlining reforms that must
occur if citizens are to enjoy full protection of their fundamental rights and freedoms in the future
of B&H.
In order to understand the current state of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is
important to inspect the agreement that formed the basis for Bosnia’s current and tenuous state of
peace. In November 1995, Dayton, Ohio was the location of the internationally-brokered peace
negotiations that would end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Signed on November 21, 1995,
the Dayton Agreement set forth an impressive legal framework that ensured the end to the violence
and a pathway towards permanent peace. Dayton established the sovereign state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, consisting of two entities: The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika
Srpska, as well as the third, autonomous and internationally-administered Brcˇko District. The
Federation was further divided into 10 cantons, each with its own Constitution, administrative
government, and relatively autonomous control over areas such as health care and education
(Nardelli, Dzidic & Jukic 2014).
In the wake of the Bosnian War, international actors set out to make the newly formed country
a protectorate of sorts. The international community installed the Office of the High Representative
(OHR), which monitors the conduct of elected officials in B&H and holds the power to remove them
if they do not act in accordance with the Constitution. Since the signing of the Dayton Accords,
most important decisions have been made by the OHR, rather than by the elected parliament of
B&H (Blanc, Hylland & Vollan 2006). The country is riddled with external influence: the OHR has
placed three foreign judges on the Constitutional Court of B&H, and the finance chamber is also
regulated by foreign experts (Pajic 1998). The system is therefore overseen as though by a team of
patronizing parents, subverting local ownership and reflecting in this need for careful supervision,
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the same lack of ownership in peacetime that existed in the peace process itself.
At the time that the Dayton Accords were signed, the agreement was deemed a model of
international efforts to involve many parties and stakeholders in the negotiation process. The
international community envisioned Dayton as a shining example for securing the individual
rights of people belonging to certain groups, while simultaneously meeting the demands of these
conflicting groups. However, an analysis of the provisions set forth by the Dayton Accords shows
that while the ideals of human rights were present, the way these values were articulated in the
Constitution has not been realized in their application on the ground. The human rights situation in
B&H today remains threatened by the ethnic discrimination and political decentralization that was
enshrined in the state’s founding documents and threatens the political and social stability of B&H
in the future (Schake 1999).
The Dayton Peace Agreement is striking for its strong rhetorical emphasis on the provision of
universal human rights. Likewise, the Constitution of B&H employs the same language, as it is
contained in the fourth annex of the Dayton Agreement. Yet it is highly disputable whether the
guarantees of human rights are as effective in practice as the architects of the Dayton Agreement
intended them to be. This disparity is immediately evident upon analysis of the Constitution. The
preamble sets forth a set of declarations that claim to protect the rights and dignities of every person
by establishing a pluralistic society:
“Based on respect for human dignity, liberty, and equality, (. . . ) Inspired by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Civil and
Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Declaration
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, as well as other human rights instruments. . . ” (Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina 1995)
While noble in its outset, these provisions are quickly compromised by the Constitution’s establish-
ment of an ethnically divided country, demonstrated in the Preamble’s last paragraph: “Bosniaks,
Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina hereby determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows. . . ”(Constitution
of B&H Preamble). In an effort to meet the demands and protect human rights of the country’s
three ethno-national groups, the Constitution sets forth ideals of inclusion for the country’s three
“constituent peoples,” but many of the rights assured to Constituent Groups in the Constitution are
not provided for individuals who do not belong within these proscribed categories (Claridge 2010).
This fact belies the inherent exclusionary basis upon which the post-war Constitution of B&H was
founded.
The controversial notion of basing a country’s Constitution on universal human rights while
also providing exclusionary recognition to three “constituent peoples” is a central underlying
contradiction within Bosnia’s post-war political structure. The political system established by the
Dayton Accords and set forth in the Constitution decrees that Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be run
by the three ethnic groups in cooperation, including a tripartite presidency with one representative
for each constituent group (Constitution of B&H, Art. V). This provision was made in order to
bolster cooperation between the ethno-national groups that once functioned together, but were
divided by the conflict. The primary goal of this power-sharing system was to enable the country to
slowly overcome these wartime divisions, and to help the country develop independently after the
temporary presence of the international community ended. Once the institutional structure proved
effective, the position of the High Representative and other forms of international oversight would
be permanently removed (Perry & Keil 2015).
Article 2 in the Constitution on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms lists human rights
from the European Convention on Human Rights.“Bosnia and Herzegovina and both Entities shall
ensure the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms”
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(Constitution of B&H Art. II). Bosnia and Herzegovina was not a member state of the Council of
Europe at that time. The Constitution therefore upheld the European Convention on Human Rights
without belonging to the international body that enforced it (Sadikovic´ 2012).
The international community sought to include elaborate provisions within the Constitution
securing universal human rights. The Constitution does offer protection from discrimination
on different bases than ethnicity, including for national minorities. However, implementing the
non-discrimination clause in Article 2 is a complex and controversial endeavour. Juxtaposing
Article 2 against the Preamble shows how the Constitution advances a conflicting concept of human
rights protection. A state cannot be simultaneously based on principles of non-discrimination that
guarantee everyone the same individual rights and representation with a country that is de facto
established and governed along the basis of ethno-national identity.
Human rights for individuals in B&H are overshadowed by the majority of ethno-national
groups afforded sole legitimate recognition, because the Constitution allows only these groups
to run for many public offices (Constitution of B&H, Art. IV, Art. V). This raises a question
about another term spawned by the Dayton Accords and enshrined in the Preamble of the Con-
stitution: the “Others.” “Others” refer to Bosnian nationals who do not identify with one of the
three ethno-national groups, or constituent peoples, of B&H. “Others” are mentioned only once in
the Constitution, whilst the three constituent ethno-national groups are mentioned numerous times
(Constitution of B&H).
The tension between rights afforded to Bosnia’s “Constituent Peoples” and “Others” represents
a transfer of power and personal agency within Bosnia’s political structure. The power is taken
from “Others” and reassigned to the three ruling ethno-national groups in order to ensure their fair
and equal representation (Sejdic´ Finci v. B&H 2009). This belies a shift of sovereignty. While it
is common practice for citizens to cede their power to the state actors, as recalled in the famous
preamble of the United States Constitution,“We the people,” the Constitution of B&H sacrifices the
powers of minority groups to offer greater power to members of the majority groups. This is written
within the same document that cites universal human rights provisions as one of its main foci.
The Constitution of B&H goes on to outline the country’s political structure, setting forth a
system in which “Others” do not enjoy the same rights as Bosniaks, Croats or Serbs. Only the
country’s three “Constituent Peoples” can run for elected office within the three-member presidency
or the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly (Claridge 2010). Article 4 deals with the
Parliamentary Assembly and the formation of House of Peoples. The House of Peoples is headed
by five Bosniaks and five Croats, all elected from the Federation, and five Serbs from Republika
Srpska. Establishing this system of separation, and the use of ethnic quotas to fill political positions,
was intended to promote cooperation and power-sharing between previously warring factions in
B&H. However, the system has instead had the opposite effect, leading to political obstructionism
between the three ethno-national groups. The three constituent peoples function as their own
separate players on all levels. Each ethno-national group deals with their own problems and remains
focused on the territory in which they hold the majority. The Dayton Agreement aimed to bridge
these divisions and forge a cooperative atmosphere between the country’s “Constituent Peoples,”
but the intended outcome has not resulted in protection of citizens’ human rights, equal treatment
under the law, and ethno-national cooperation that international actors anticipated.
By now, it is clear that the political system set forth by the Dayton Agreement has resulted
in a disparity between the expected outcome of the Constitution’s human rights provisions and
the reality in B&H today. People in Bosnia and Herzegovina live within a tripartite “ethnocracy,”
a conflict-prone political system in which groups compete for dominance on the basis of ethnic-
ity (Yiftachel 1999, Howard 2012). In B&H, this separates one group from another instead of
compelling these groups to work together. The “Others” cannot achieve full enjoyment of their
civic rights, excluded as they are from political representation in the House of Peoples and other
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political offices. There is simply no equal space for anyone that does not conform or belong to a
“constituent” ethno-national group.
Article 5 of the Constitution, focused on the Presidency, faces the same issue. In its provisions,
Article 5 states that both entities shall vote on the members of the presidency. One Bosniak and
Croat from the Federation along with a Serb from RS shall be elected as members of the tripartite
presidency (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995). The chairman of the presidency rotates
every eight months. The issue at hand is once again the imperative of having an ethnically-based
composition. Only a Bosniak, Croat or Serb can run for presidency, thus excluding all “Others.” The
Council of Ministers is likewise composed of elected representatives based on ethnic representation.
Analysing the numerous ways in which ethno-national division is enshrined within the political
system in B&H, it is sufficient to say that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina established a
paradoxical state. A constitutional order which guarantees human rights to all citizens in theory,
but denies them equal political representation in practice, is an ongoing challenge that cripples
Bosnia’s post-war development. As Bosnia’s current leaders look hopefully towards one day joining
the European Union, Bosnia cannot afford to trade off individual rights in favour of inter-group
stability, especially when that stability bears the high price of maintaining a status quo built upon
an ethnic quota system. Yet lawmakers in B&H have a disincentive to reform the Constitution, as
their own positions are secured by perpetuating the ethnic quota structure.
This leaves Bosnia stranded. If change is attempted domestically, any attempts to reform
Bosnia’s Constitution are met with administrative obstacles and political obstructionism. It is,
however, no easier task to initiate these changes from outside Bosnia as international actors lack the
will to meddle with the country’s complex internal affairs. Lethargic and frustrated, the people of
B&H are growing weary of the country’s political impasse and economic stagnation, leading many
to seek opportunities abroad. This has led to an exodus of young educated people, a demographic
trend which only exacerbates the current crisis as the country haemorrhages its much-needed talent,
skill and human capital. Around 68,000 young people left B&H in 2014 alone, contributing to
an already sweeping number of Bosnians living in the diaspora and sending remittances home
(Jukic 2013, Mitrovic 2013). Some citizens have taken to the streets in worker strikes, student
demonstrations, and the sweeping protest movement labelled the “Bosnian Spring” by international
media in 2014, when protests and citizen plenums began in Tuzla in February 2014 and spread
to many other cities across Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country faces a crossroads and requires
constitutional reform to ensure equal human rights protection of ordinary citizens in daily life. We
will now shift to analysing several areas in which human rights are jeopardized in B&H today.
Having firmly established the inherent contradictions within the Bosnian Constitution in regards
to ethno-national representation and ethnic quotas in public office, we must now examine how
human rights have been protected or violated in practice, contrasting three areas in which the
Bosnian government fails to ensure the protection of human rights to its citizens. After examining
key examples of how freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom from discrimination
are implemented in practice in contemporary B&H, this article will conclude by offering a brief
analysis of several factors that contribute to the disparity between the image of human rights set
forth in Bosnia’s founding Constitution and the many failings Bosnia currently experiences in
protecting the fundamental rights of its citizens.
To begin, it must be acknowledged that despite the many shortcomings and weaknesses of
the Dayton Agreement and the resulting Constitution, many of the basic human rights set forth
in the Constitution have been assured and protected under the current Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Citizens are assured many of their basic rights and are largely granted freedom of
movement within the country, freedom from inhumane treatment, freedom of religion, and the rights
to property and education. Indeed, the current status of human rights in B&H has been improving,
albeit slowly, in the 21 years since the signing of the Dayton Accords. Yet the dysfunctional system
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of ethnic segregation and political deadlock that resulted from the Dayton Agreement offered a
short-term solution instead of a long-term resolution to the problems that plagued Bosnia and
Herzegovina at the war’s end. Dayton brought an end to the war, but did not embody a long-view
for establishing a functional state capable of guaranteeing rights to all its citizens.
There remain several key areas in which universal human rights are threatened under the current
political leadership in B&H today. Systematic violations of freedom of the press, freedom of
assembly, and non-discrimination based on ethno-national and religious identity occur throughout
B&H. These violations fly in the face of human rights conventions referenced by the Bosnian
Constitution, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention
on Human Rights. The following analysis will assess the current human rights situation in B&H
within these three categories before offering recommendations and conclusions.
Freedom of the press in B&H faces significant challenges due to the political influence exerted
on journalists and media outlets. Public broadcasting stations are fraught with corrupt political
influence, under-funded, jeopardizing standards of journalism and independent reporting (Smajic
& Latal 2016). The country’s public broadcasting system, its three public TV stations – the state
BHTV and the two entities’ stations, FTV and RTRS, are close to collapse, deemed by one set of
BIRN journalists as “a metaphor for the slow disintegration of the country itself” (ibid). While
independent news sources are popular, these struggle to survive without financial support from
political or business interests. Media sources that try to remain independent can face more serious
repercussions. In 2014, police raided the offices of Klix.ba, the most popular news site in B&H,
after Klix published an incriminating recording of Željka Cvijanovic´. Cvijanovic´, the prime minis-
ter of Republika Srpska, was recorded discussing how the ruling Alliance of Independent Social
Democrats (SNSD) had bribed two members of Parliament for their support to ensure SNSD would
retain a majority in the RS parliament (BIRN 2015). Rather than opening investigations into these
documented acts of corruption, the police directed their attention at Klix, searching the offices and
confiscating cell phones, hard drives, CDs, and flash drives, leading to an outcry by journalists that
their right to protect informants was being violated, and that the freedom of press in B&H was
being compromised (Radomirovic n.d.).
The right to free assembly is also at risk in B&H, as seen by the excessive force and unlawful
detention exercised by state police during the 2014 protests. Human Rights Watch documented 19
cases of the use of excessive force in Tuzla and Sarajevo, and called for an investigation of police
violence against journalists covering the protests (Human Rights Watch 2014). It is impossible
to know how frequently police officers have detained protesters unlawfully if press coverage is
suppressed and journalists intimidated in this way. This threat to free assembly and free expression
discourages citizens in B&H from protesting and expressing opposition to government leaders, and
creates an atmosphere of intimidation that stifles civic engagement and constructive dialogue on
political reforms. Basic freedoms and security are also jeopardized by the corruption of police
forces in B&H, which make police officers more likely to accept bribes and weakens the rule of
law (Arslanagic 2010).
Finally, the tenets of the Constitution in B&H violate the human right to non-discrimination
on the basis of ethno-national and religious identity. In 2000, the ruling by the Constitutional
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina secured equal rights for the previously-mentioned “Constituent
Peoples” of B&H, protecting rights for members of the country’s dominant ethnic groups but further
entrenching the divided social and political structure in B&H. As noted by Pajic (1998, p. 132),
“the entire political structure of the country is based on a quite contrary principle: the principle of
exclusive ethnic representation, of the three ‘constituent peoples’ only, at the expense of individual
rights.” The ethno-national divisions inscribed within the Constitution lead to legal and political
deadlock and a hardening of opposing group identities (Mansfield 2003). These divisions are
passed down in a segregated education system, called Two Schools Under One Roof, and children
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who are ethnic minorities often have less access to resources and quality instruction. The divided
education system in B&H is problematic for its discriminatory nature, but also because it bears
the potential to reignite violence by stoking the flames of the country’s past conflicts. Children
learn different historical narratives from divided educational texts, for example, which promote
“us-them” terminology and ethno-national discrimination from the early primary school years
(Torsti 2009). One way this system reinforces division is in the way textbooks frame recent wartime
events in terms of historical continuity: one Serb textbook states that the “Serbian people were
again forced to defend their honor with weapons” (Pejic 1997, p. 7, italics added in Torsti 2009)
while the Bosniak book refers to how the “Serbian-chetnik genocide against Muslims has deep
roots” (Imamovic et al 1994, p. 96, italics added in Torsti 2009).
The current Constitution of B&H protects the rights of “constituent peoples” while largely
denying individual rights for those who do not identify with one of the three main ethno-national
groups. This was ruled a violation of the ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights in 2009,
when a Roma activist, Dervo Sejdic and a Jewish man, Jakob Finci, challenged the discrimination
within the Bosnian Constitution in which some elected offices, including the tripartite presidency,
can only be held by a Bosniak Croat or Serb, as explored in the previous constitutional analysis. By
virtue of having signed the ECHR, B&H is obligated to implement the judgments and recommen-
dations of the ECtHR, although it has yet to do so. Furthermore, the Bosnian Constitution requires
revision before Bosnia and Herzegovina can join the European Union; the lack of implementation
is all the more significant after B&H submitted its application to join the EU in February 2016.
These examples demonstrate ways in which the Bosnian Constitution set forth an ambitious
set of provisions to protect universal human rights and collective rights of its constituent peoples,
yet embodied an inherent contradiction by structuring the country’s political system along ethno-
national lines and protecting groups based on their identification with these limited, proscribed
categories. To conclude, it is important to explore several additional factors that contribute to the
disparity between Bosnia’s human rights-focused Constitution and the flaws in implementation
of these provisions: decentralization of the Bosnian government, ineffectiveness of Bosnia’s non-
governmental sector, and the rampant corruption and nepotism that have ravaged the Bosnian public
and private sectors.
Decentralization in Bosnia’s post-war political structure has played a role in hindering a coor-
dinated response by multiple actors at different levels of government in addressing human rights
abuses that persist throughout the country. The Bosnian state has 13 distinct governments, along
with a Constitution for every single canton, entity, and district. A federal and decentralized country,
it may give the illusion that B&H functions like the cantonal system in Switzerland, but the reality
is quite different. Because of these vast layers of administrative division, the general public and the
government itself is faced with tackling an incomprehensible bureaucracy in order to achieve any
substantive change. Public service delivery is severely compromised by the disparity between the
normative framework governing B&H and the implementation of local government practices in
reality (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2011).
Furthermore, the entity-level and cantonal divisions in B&H create a system in which the
majority of political actors are acting in their own ethno-national group’s interests, diminishing
loyalty for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. Decentralization not only leads to a
lack of coordination in shaping policies and interventions at the local, entity, and state-wide levels,
but it has allowed nationalist sentiment to flourish among ethno-national groups that administer
their territories in relative autonomy. The lack of a centralized, unifying leadership in B&H, and the
international actors who exercise significant control of the country’s political and economic system,
contributes to citizens’ lack of ownership and identification with the state as a whole. Not only
does decentralization foster economic stagnation and corruption of public officials, but in a country
experiencing such critical rates of “brain drain,” a weak sense of identification with the country
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only compounds the lack of loyalty young people feel to stay in B&H long-term. These young
people often must choose between moving abroad or joining the corrupt and ethnically-divided
state bureaucracy to survive. Bosnia’s decentralized ethnocratic political system is thus a challenge
for implementing reforms in B&H, but also contributes to long-term demographic concerns for the
future stability and development of the Bosnian state.
A second factor that hinders addressing human rights concerns in B&H is the over-burdened
non-governmental sector. Bosnia has an enormous amount of non-governmental organizations
working on similar issues, competing for limited funding and often overlapping in their missions
and project designs. A strong, well-coordinated NGO sector could have a positive impact on
addressing issues that affect the country’s civil society and social development, yet this has not been
the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the war, the international community relegated sweeping
authorities to the civil sector for brokering the country’s transition from a socialist federated state to
a democratic country operating a market economy. The NGO sector was therefore burdened with an
enormous task. The international community lacked a long-term vision for how these civil society
initiatives could strengthen human rights and reconciliation, and ultimately led to a dependency
trap of local initiatives on continued international support (Belloni 2001, Bieber 2002). Without
central coordination after the war, foreign-funded NGOs in B&H competed for contracts to advance
their own mission-specific agendas, hindering cooperation and causing NGOs to follow short-term
trends of donor priorities instead of long-term capacity building (Bieber 2002, Martin & Miller
2003). Two decades after the war, this approach has contributed to an ineffective but saturated civil
sector. One telling example of NGO inefficiency relates to the disproportionate amount of foreign
donors funding provided for educational youth seminars. By targeting youth as more open-minded
actors and presuming they are more likely to fulfil donors’ peacebuilding agendas, NGOs have
focused significant funding on youth-related workshops and conferences. These programmes,
however, often reach out to involve many of the same participants, creating a redundant, somewhat
elitist sector in which foreign-funded reconciliation programmes cater to the same group of liberal
youth again and again, without ever reaching the more nationalistic or disengaged youth in Bosnian
society (Micinski 2016). In many ways, therefore, the overburdened NGO sector is ineffective at
shaping a civil society adequately prepared to address human rights concerns or advocate reforms
in B&H. The NGO realm remains an insular sector, not having achieved the necessary cooperation
of the state bureaucracy needed to systemically combat abuses and human rights violations.
Finally, the high levels of corruption and nepotism in the government administration and the
NGO sector in B&H weaken efforts to address human rights concerns in the country. Corruption
hinders human rights protection in numerous ways, restricting access to basic services like medical
care, police protection, and education (Bacio-Terracino 2010). Bosnia and Herzegovina faces high
rates of corruption among doctors, municipal officials, police officers, nurses, teachers, social pro-
tection officials, and judges, among others (Bosso 2014). Not only does corruption directly inhibit
access to basic human rights by withholding direct services in exchange for bribes, but it obstructs
the legal mechanisms to enforce laws and prosecute abuses. Corruption within the police forces and
judicial institutions in B&H, for example, creates an environment in which police raids on news
agencies and unlawful detention of protesters can occur with impunity (UNODC Report 2011).
The reasons for this are complex, and while the persistence of corruption in B&H cannot be solely
attributed to domestic or foreign factors, the international community’s involvement in the country’s
transition from socialism to capitalism led to a hybrid between outward pronouncements of a liberal
agenda supporting “good governance,” while international actors have in some ways legitimized
the spread of corruption outside the country’s formal legal structures (Belloni & Strazzari 2014).
Having analysed several ways in which international actors who drafted the Bosnian Con-
stitution employed ambitious language promoting universal human rights and compliance with
international conventions, this article has sought to contrast these proclamations with the reality
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in B&H today. By highlighting the contradictions within a Constitution that advocates for human
rights while outlining a state structure based on ethnic exclusion and division, we have examined
the ways in which the international community imagined a future of ethno-national cooperation
and collective group rights for Bosnia and Herzegovina while simultaneously designing a political
system that decentralized administrative powers to ensure fundamental protection under the law.
This has led to weak central enforcement mechanisms to prevent human rights abuses in B&H today,
resulting in particularly concerning violations of freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and
freedom from discrimination. The extreme decentralization of Bosnia’s political system, along with
the competing mandates of the NGO sector and widespread corruption, hinders the development of
a systematic approach to addressing the existing threats to human rights in B&H.
It is necessary to develop stronger and more equal protection for citizens in B&H, not solely
enforced by outside actors like the High Representative, to improve the human rights situation
in B&H. The solutions to these problems require further research, collaboration, and a genuine
concerted effort from the many stakeholders and actors involved, both foreign and domestic.
Having analysed many of the problems plaguing the human rights situation in B&H, we include
with recommendations to streamline overlapping organizations within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
non-governmental sector, establishing stronger linkages between civil society organizations and
government institutions, and developing better oversight and monitoring procedures to fight corrup-
tion.
The government of B&H must also undertake constitutional reforms to address the inherent
contradictions embedded in the Bosnian Constitution, namely the exclusion of minorities from
political leadership positions. An important step in this process is to build more bipartisan political
support for reform, and to foster support from international and domestic civil society actors for the
development of non-ethnically aligned political parties who can help steer the country’s political
climate away from ethnically-exclusive representation. Only after enacting sweeping reforms of
this contradictory Constitution can citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina fully enjoy their rights and
freedoms, and achieve the level of human rights promised by the post-war Constitution.
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5. Dynamic Interpretation Tradition at the ECtHR
HELGA MOLBÆK-STEENSIG
In Defence of Dynamic Interpretation Tradition at the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights
Abstract
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is under pressure because of non-compliance by
ratifying states and negative national discourses. Increasingly, national parliaments, governments,
and even national courts are questioning the legitimacy of the dynamic interpretation tradition and
the ECtHR’s use of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as a living instrument for
progressive improvement of human rights protection.
This article will account for the tendency of non-compliance and review the negative discourses
to establish their normative and practical basis. The critique will be set against the historical, legal,
and pragmatic background for the dynamic interpretation tradition, asking whether the legitimacy
challenge is legitimate.
Introduction
The Council of Europe (CoE) created the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its
court (ECtHR) after the Second World War, with the expressed purpose of furthering European
Unity in order to prevent another devastating war. The concepts of both human rights and supra-
national control mechanisms were integrated parts of the international rule of law paradigm that
was the outcome of the supra-concept of war avoidance (Schulz-Forberg 2011: 40-42).
In post-war Europe, the ECHR and the ECtHR can therefore best be understood as the goal
of war avoidance through the toolbox of human rights and European unity. This is part of the
reasoning behind the dynamic interpretation doctrine, which is applied in connection with the
European consensus doctrine. It was first utilised in the Tyrer v UK case on corporal punishment in
1978, where the phrasing highlights the connection between European unity and expanding rights:
“The Court must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument which. . . must be interpreted
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in the light of present-day conditions. In the case now before it the Court cannot but be influenced
by the developments and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the member States of
the Council of Europe in this field.” (Tyrer v UK 1978 para 31).
That is, the ECHR is a living instrument and the ECtHR will therefore take into account devel-
opments in the CoE member states when interpreting what the broadly phrased material rights in the
ECHR entail. In the Tyrer-case the ECtHR determined that while corporal punishment had not been
considered inhumane or degrading treatment when the ECHR came into effect, the contemporary
standards in the member states’ penal orders suggested that this form of institutionalised violence
was no longer acceptable and should therefore be categorised as degrading treatment under article
3.
Furthermore, through the creation of the ECHR, the CoE member states wished to ‘maintain
and further realise’ the rights prescribed in the Universal declaration and move towards a collective
enforcement of these rights (ECHR Preamble). The ECtHR’s interpretation tradition in which
the dynamic interpretation consists of a set of principles on effective protection, subsidiarity, pro-
portionality, legality, and emerging consensus (Greer 2000: 14-22) is thus a pragmatic way of
maintaining and further realising the rights prescribed in the ECHR.
The interpretive tradition does not set the ECHR and the ECtHR apart from most international
courts as it is in line with interpretive methods as described by the Vienna convention (1969: art.
31), but the broad scope of the ECHR and the ECtHRs compulsory jurisdiction does. With a few
notable exceptions, state consent for international court jurisdiction is usually given either on a
case-by-case basis or through special agreements where the state decides exactly what jurisdiction
it agrees to. The ECHR does not allow for such general reservations or ad hoc acceptance of
jurisdiction (ECHR article 57).
The few other international courts that also wield compulsory jurisdiction have been challenged
in similar ways, including the Court of Justice for the European Union (Ajos A/S v A, 2016), and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic 1995).
This article will deal with the increasingly vocal challenge to the legitimacy of the ECtHR’s
dynamic interpretation tradition: a challenge that comes from both public and political discourse,
academic discourse, as well as through non-compliance from member states.
The Challenge
Within political discourse, the challenge to the dynamic interpretation tradition appears to be
Europe-wide. The current UK prime minister, Theresa May, was in favour of the UK leaving the
ECHR when she was still home secretary campaigning for Remain in the Brexit vote(BBC April
27, 2016), though that plan appears to be temporarily put on hold after the Leave vote (Wagner
Human Rights News, Views and Info. 10. 8. 2016).
Meanwhile in Denmark, as the state takes on the presidency of the CoE in November 2017, the
official direction of the government is to break with the dynamic interpretation tradition (Regerings-
grundlag 2016: 55-56) while the nationalist partner in the Parliament suggest leaving the convention
outright (Messerschmidt 2.2.2015). Even the main opposition party, the social democrats, are
campaigning against the dynamic interpretation (Bramsen 21.8.2017). Similar murmurs on the
legitimate power of the ECtHR over national courts are taking place in Switzerland and Russia,
while the Norwegian parliament is debating whether international conventions can be adapted to
allow for lesser obligations in relation to refugees (Jagland, General Secretary Council of Europe
speech to parliamentary assembly 26.1.2016).
Poland and Hungary’s current approach to the concepts of European values and European
solidarity as has become evident during the refugee crisis can also be seen as part of this chal-
lenge, although it is only by proxy related to the ECtHR. This adverse political reaction towards
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international courts in general and the ECtHR in particular, not only from the far right, but across
the political spectrum in several West and East European states, suggest a break with the current
paradigm of international rule of law and European unity that was envisioned at the outset of the
ECHR. The adversaries of the international rule of law utilise for the most part a reductionist
understanding of democracy, where a majority can rule supreme without taking into account the
rights and needs of minorities, nor the need for and tradition of societal institutions other than
executive power.
In addition to the political challenge taking place in the public discourse, there is an increasing
log of cases of non-compliance. The most tangible evidence of challenges to the court’s normative
power is the increasing number of delayed implementations or outright non-compliance with
judgements from the ECtHR (Muižnieks 2016). While there are only a few famous cases of direct
non-implementation of judgements (Abdelgawad 2008: 64) - including but not limited to Sejdic
and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009, Hirst no 2 v UK 2005, and Cyprus v Turkey 2014 - the
high and increasing number of ’repetitive cases’ – cases with very similar complaints in the same
countries – indicate that structural problems have not been dealt with (Forst 2013: 1).
In 2016, two thirds of new cases were repetitive cases (ECtHR annual Report 2016: 15). In
order to deal with the caseload caused by this, the court established the Pilot Judgement procedure
in which it freezes repetitive cases, identifies the structural problems behind them, and advises
the states on how to alleviate the problem (Factsheet Pilot Judgements 2016). While the official
objective of the Pilot Judgement procedure is to assist the member states in solving systematic
problems, the discourse that accompanied UK non-compliance in the Hirst v UK and Greens v UK
cases is an indicator that some states may be choosing not to comply, rather than simply failing to
comply.
Since the court relies on states to implement its judgements, a tendency for wilful non-
compliance is a threat to the court’s normative power and legitimacy. The most recent report
from the Committee of Ministers suggest that while the ECtHR’s challenge in regards to caseload
appears to be easing, the number of repetitive cases keeps rising, and the payments of just satisfac-
tion is not completed in 35 percent of cases, up from 29 percent in 2015 (10th Annual Report of the
Committee of Ministers 2016: 9-10). At this point, it should be noted that there is a plethora of
reasons for non-payment that do not necessarily indicate wilful non-compliance, including, but not
limited to, difficulties locating recipients of just satisfaction.
Lastly, there is a challenge to the dynamic interpretation in academic and judicial discourse.
These challenges utilise either a normative argument for subsidiarity, which comes with an un-
derstanding of democracy as opposed to human rights, or they rely on a pragmatic argument that
the power of the ECtHR is challenged by non-compliance, and a greater use of the margin of
appreciation doctrine and lesser use of the dynamic interpretation/emerging consensus doctrine
could alleviate this.
In the following, I will present the ECtHR’s interpretation doctrine in greater detail, followed
by a review of the mainstream academic normative and pragmatic challenge, and finally adopt a
critical view of these normative and pragmatic challenges.
The ECtHR’s interpretation tradition
Since the power of the ECtHR to enforce its judgements relies on states adhering to its decisions
with an expectation that other states also do so, it is a threat to the ECtHR when states fail to carry
out its decisions. This is an argument for employing the subsidiarity principle in cases where there
is a risk that the state might not comply. At the same time, the court will lose legitimacy and appear
biased if it does not find in favour of the applicants in cases with clear human rights violations.
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An example of this critique is the dissenting opinion of Judge Marcus Helmon in the Cyprus v
Turkey case from 2001. Here the ECtHR had accepted the Turkish military courts (TRNCs) as
domestic remedies – a decision Helmon thought would hurt the ECtHR’s legitimacy, “. . . it is a
mistake of the court to accept the TRNC in Turkey as domestic remedies because they are clear
unlawful practices that are not in accordance with international legal standards” (Judge Helmon’s
party dissenting opinion, subtitle The European Convention on Human Rights, para 2)
The public discourse on what constitutes a clear human rights violation is changing over time.
The Christine Goodwin v UK case from 1995 is one of the most famous cases of this. Goodwin
was not the first transgendered person to challenge the state on her right to identification as another
gender than the one assigned at birth, but the ECtHR reached a different judgement in her case than
in previous ones (Rees v UK 1986, Cossey v UK 1990, Sheffield and Horsham v UK 1998). The
interpretation took place in the light of recent social and legal developments in order to reach the
decision that best ensured the purpose of the court established in the preamble. That is – maintain
and further human rights in order to achieve greater European unity.
Thus, the ECtHR stated in the Goodwin case: “The Court . . . attaches . . . importance . . .
to the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of
increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of
post-operative transsexuals.” (Christine Goodwin v UK 1995 para 85). The ECtHR could not
have made this decision when it was first established in 1959 because the recognition that there
is such a thing as a transgender person is more recent than that. The reasoning for having the
dynamic interpretation is thus that the ECHR has to be adaptable for a changing world. Not only in
terms of new protected groups or changing social structures, but also in more technological terms,
such as including electronic communication in the scope of article 8 on privacy, or internet portals
as freedom of the press within the scope of article 10 (Ahmet Yildirim v Turkey 2012, Times
Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom 2009).
The ECtHR’s dynamic interpretation tradition that has made the above-mentioned expansions
of the scope of the ECHR possible relies on the Vienna Convention’s article 31, which states that
treaties should be interpreted in the light of their object and purpose and taking into account its con-
text including its preamble (Vienna Convention on the law of treaties 1969: Art. 31). The ECtHR’s
expansive capabilities are however still subject to certain restraints, including commitment to the
text, the margin of appreciation, and the emerging consensus doctrine (Dothan 2016: 515-516).
The margin of appreciation
One of the restraints on the dynamic interpretation tradition at the ECtHR is the margin of appre-
ciation doctrine. The doctrine was developed early on in ECtHR case law, first with regards to
derogation in times of emergency (Lawless v Ireland no 3 1961), and later in general (Belgian
linguistics case no 2 1968 para 10 (Subheading: Interpretation adopted by the Court)). The margin
of appreciation doctrine emerges from a host of pragmatic and normative assumptions:
1) There is a legitimate balancing act between the rights of the individual, and the interests of
the community: “The Court considers that the general aim set for themselves by the Contracting
Parties through the medium of the European Convention on Human Rights, was to provide effective
protection of fundamental human rights. . . The Convention therefore implies a just balance between
the protection of the general interest of the Community and the respect due to fundamental human
rights while attaching particular importance to the latter.” (Belgian Linguistics case 1968: para 5
(Subheading: Interpretation adopted by the Court)).
2) Different communities may have different interests. This was considered in the A, B, and C
v Ireland case (2010: para 185), where the prohibition of abortion was viewed in the case of the
two first applicants as within the state’s margin of appreciation, because it was based in specific
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religious and ethical values in Irish society and there was no Europe-wide common understanding
of when life begins.
3) The margin of appreciation comes from an administrative consideration, where as a rule the
ECtHR reviews procedure rather than facts. This is in part because the ECtHR is far removed from
the situations it deals with, both in time and geography, and in part because the national courts are
part of the ECtHR system and both can and should apply the rights directly. This was explored in
the Handyside case, where the state argued for a wide margin of appreciation: “. . . it is in no way
the Court’s task to take the place of the competent national courts but rather to review under Article
10 (art. 10) the decisions they delivered in the exercise of their power of appreciation” (Handyside
v UK 1976: para 50).
Moreover, the margin of appreciation doctrine has a normative foundation in the principle
of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is the idea that decisions should be taken as close as possible to the
people they affect, in part because the decisions can be better localised and in part because the
decision-makers are closer by and can be subjected to local democratic control.
There is, however, a logical limit to the reach of the margin of appreciation in the ECtHR’s
application. The principle cannot be used when the state has miscalculated the balance between
the rights of the individual and the interests of society, when its cultural specificities cannot be
reconciled with the protection of fundamental human rights and European standards, or if the
domestic procedural protections are not in order. In the cases mentioned above it is thus important
to note that in the Belgian linguistics case, the court did find in favour of the applicants, because
while the state did have the margin of appreciation to weigh the rights of the individual against the
interests of the community, it had granted too little weight to the individual. In the A, B, and C v
Ireland case, the court found that while the state had a wide margin of appreciation in the case of
applicants A and B, there was still a violation of applicant C’s rights under article 8, because her
life had been endangered by the anti-abortion laws, and this was not within the margin.
Given the complexity of the principle and the risk of diminishing the ECtHR’s reach, why does
it apply the margin of appreciation?
Practical
In terms of practicality, the ECtHR has employed the margin of appreciation to cases where access
to facts is difficult to come by. In cases on the right to family life, the court has ruled that the state
has a wide margin of appreciation in deciding on custody of children. The reasoning is that the
state authorities are closer to the people concerned and thus know better. The court will review the
procedural protection but not the material assessment in custody cases. When parental access is
denied entirely, the interference is intensive enough that the state does not have a wide margin of
appreciation (Sommerfeld v Germany 2003: para 63, 64 and 66).
Another practical reason is to battle the large backlog of cases at the ECtHR. At the Interlaken
conference in 2010 the Council of Europe adopted an action plan for reducing the backlog that
among other measures relied on the national implementation of the convention to be interpreted by
domestic courts (Interlaken Declaration 2010: PP 6, (6), Action plan B.). The overall idea is that
the ECtHR is swarmed with cases, but by invoking the margin of appreciation doctrine, the cases
are referred back to the less burdened domestic courts, which are then in charge of applying the
ECHR.
Pragmatic
The political or pragmatic reason for the margin of appreciation has to do with the nature of
international law. Ultimately, the legitimacy of the ECtHR relies on the signatory states carrying
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out its sentences, and when they do not, the ECtHR’s soft power suffers. One of the things the
states are supposed to gain from adhering to the court’s decisions is that other states do the same.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the constitution was found to be in violation of art 14 on
discrimination in the Sejdic-Finci case (Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009), the
ECtHR has more enforcement power because the EU has conditioned membership on compliance
with the judgement. Positively, this helps to enforce judgement in a country where gaining the
necessary majority in all chambers to change the constitution is difficult, but negatively, it can also
create an unequal power dynamic between ratifying states that are subject to conditionality and
those that are not. Potentially, this inequality could undermine the local perception of the ECHR’s
legitimacy in a similar way to the perception of the legitimacy of the EU conditionality in the
accession process (Molbæk-Steensig 2015: 13-21). By referring cases back to domestic courts, the
ECtHR avoids these threats to its legitimacy, although it must weigh this against the threat to its
legitimacy that comes from not finding a violation of human rights in cases where it is necessary.
Normative
The normative reasoning for adhering to the subsidiarity principle in general and the margin of
appreciation in particular is connected to both state sovereignty as an inherent quality, and to
the issue of democratic mandate. The argument is that because state authorities in the form of
parliament and government are democratically elected, and the judges of the ECtHR are not, the
ECtHR should employ the principle of subsidiarity whenever possible. In addition, states with
better democratic institutions should be granted a wider margin of appreciation than states that are
still struggling (Christoffersen 2014: 82).
Moreover, a legalist argument is that the ECHR exists because the signatory states have con-
ferred sovereignty to it through ratification. This means that the ECtHR cannot have any more
power than has been conferred to it. This is a fundamentally dualist view of international law.
It is the same principle the Danish Supreme Court established in the Maastricht case in 1998,
where it determined that the Danish constitution does allow for transfer of sovereignty to the
EU, but it does not allow for transfer of constitutional power, because it is the constitution that
allows the transfer of sovereignty in the first place (UfR.1998.800.H). From this perspective, state
sovereignty is the starting point, and thus international law and international treaties only apply
to the extent that sovereignty has been conferred to them. This view may be in opposition to
progressive interpretation mechanisms, because progressive interpretation can be seen as extending
the court’s reach after conferral of sovereignty. The reasoning does not grant human rights any
fundamental quality different from international treaties on trade, borders or other agreements. This
differs of course from monist understandings of international law, where the creation of states is an
international endeavour which is why international law is necessarily above national law (Kelsen
1992[1934]:111).
Challenging the argument for subsidiarity in human rights application
There are several potential problems with the dualist view and normative reasoning for the principle
of subsidiarity. First, human rights in the universal declaration, on which the convention is based
according to its preamble, have a philosophical basis in an inherent human dignity (Universal
declaration on Human Rights: Preamble). This notion gives human rights a special significance in
international law and thus puts the individual ahead of the state; if not in general, then at least in
the treaties and conventions themselves where it is also part of the letter of the law. Power politics,
pragmatics, and practical limitations may prevent this, but that should be of no consequence in a
normative discussion. The philosophical background for human rights in new natural law makes
the individual the unit of analysis, and the principle of subsidiarity should rather be employed to
protect the individual from abuse than to grant the state impunity: "[. . . ] even the authority of the
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states is justified on the basis that such powers benefit individual persons’ interests better than
alternative institutional structures." (Føllesdal 2013: 61)
Second, the political progression in international relations is moving towards an individual-
based rather than a state-based morality. As an example of this, the responsibility to protect (R2P)
doctrine agreed on at the UN summit in 2005 relies on the notion that states have a responsibility
to protect their citizens from human rights abuses (2005 World Summit outcome document art.
138). And when they do not, the international community has a responsibility to intervene through
collective action, peacefully when possible, but with force if necessary (art. 139). If we rely on an
understanding of democracy as practically and normatively good because more people take part in
the decisions and thus reduce the risk of errors and bad decisions that benefit only a minority, it is a
relevant point that the R2P was endorsed by all UN member states, a large majority of which has
democratic elections.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, while democracy represents greater numbers of the popu-
lation than any other known system of government, it still has the pitfall of majoritarian abuse of
minorities and individuals that human rights are specifically designed to correct. An understanding
of democracy that does not include minority protection is reductionist, anti-pluralist, and prone
to populist and majoritarian surges. Some groups, such as ethnic or sexual minorities have lesser
influence over the political decisions whilst also being at risk of abuse. There are also groups which
do not have the right to vote at all, including foreigners, children, and in some countries prisoners.
These groups are very much affected by state decisions, in many cases more than members of the
vote-carrying majority, but have no democratic influence;“. . . Some may argue that foreigners and
prisoners are properly excluded from the political process; but this does not mean that their rights
can be freely abused.” (Dothan 2016: 13).
Eyal Benvenisti has similarly argued in detail that a majoritarian/minority view should be
applied to the margin of appreciation. A wide margin is thus appropriate when the policies affect
the entire population, such as with restrictions on hate speech, but not when the policies affect only
a minority: “Majorities often monopolize political power with little more than half of the votes and
thus use the democratic processes as means to secure their interests at the expense of the minority.
In view of this inherent deficiency in the democratic system, national policies warrant no deference
when minority rights and interests are implicated.” (Benvenisti 1999: 847-849).
The emerging consensus doctrine
The emerging consensus doctrine can be viewed as a method for determining when the margin of
appreciation doctrine can no longer be applied. The emerging consensus doctrine thus regulates
when the ECtHR uses dynamic interpretation. It is intimately connected with the goal of European
Unity and assumes that when there is an emerging consensus in Europe, the states are more likely
to comply. This makes it possible for the ECtHR to suspend the margin of appreciation doctrine,
and further human rights protection and collective enforcement as prescribed in the preamble.
Utilising comparative law as reasoning for improving conditions is neither an innovation by the
ECtHR nor a particularly controversial methodology. States have been doing this before European
integration by utilizing comparative law in the legislative process. For example, when Denmark
adopted its first democratic constitution in 1849, it declared that this move was inspired by Norway’s
transition to democracy in 1814 (Fabricius Møller 2014: 540). When the constitution was amended
in 1953 to include several new rights and organisational changes, but most importantly to lower
the age of suffrage, the reasoning by then prominent law scholar Alf Ross, was that most other
countries in Europe had lower age of suffrage, and therefore Denmark should too (Ross 1948: 5).
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A potential issue with the emerging consensus doctrine is that it assumes a continuous movement
in the European consensus towards more freedom rather than less, and towards greater European
unity rather than disintegration (ECHR: preamble). While this assumption may be correct in the
long run, the current negative discourses on the ECHR and ECtHR as presented in this article may
challenge this in the short term. Furthermore, the notion of a movement towards European unity or
the EU equivalent ‘an ever closer union’ appears threatened by Brexit and far right nationalism on
the rise in Poland, Hungary, the Netherlands et cetera. With this in mind, it is relevant to review
how the emerging consensus doctrine could fare in a climate where the consensus is not necessarily
going towards expansion of the convention.
Progressive development in a time of regression
The ECHR has provisions in place to prevent abuse of rights. Article 17 prescribes that one person’s
rights cannot be used to abuse another’s rights, nor the values of the ECHR, “Nothing in this
Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in
any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth
herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.” (ECHR art.
17).
Article 17 is a testament to the creation of the ECHR as a response to the crimes against
humanity committed during the Second World War. This has been used especially to limit the
protection of free speech under article 10 to not include the right to hate speech and incitement to
violence (Pavel Ivanov v Russia 2007: para 1, Garaudy v France 2003). Thus, both cases mentioned
above denied the applicants the right to have their hate speech against a minority protected by the
ECHR. In the Ivanov-case, the applicant sought to have his texts and speeches which portrayed the
Jewish minority in Russia as an evil and incited violence against them protected under article 10,
while the in the Garaudy-case the applicant sought to have holocaust-denial protected under article
10. Both cases were declared inadmissible.
Article 17 deals with a question that has been posed in constitutional law and theory on
democracy long before the advent of the ECHR. Namely, should the rights and freedoms delivered
by the constitution/democracy/human rights include the right to attempt to destroy those rights?
Popularised in Nordic literature as whether a freedom should be “For Loki as well as for Thor”
(Ross 1948: 17). The ECHR’s solution is a resounding ‘No’. The rights prescribed in the ECHR do
not include the right to destroy the ECHR.
The convention also has article 53 to ensure that the convention cannot be used to diminish
rights granted by other national or international law: “Nothing in this Convention shall be construed
as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be
ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is
a party.” (ECHR art. 53).
In applicable law, this means that states cannot legislate to avoid adhering to the ECHR, but
they can also not use the ECHR to violate rights already prescribed in their constitutions or other
international obligations. In other words, there is no legal option to diminish rights in a political
climate of regression or isolationism.
The Charter of fundamental rights for the European Union (EUC) has employed this interpretation
of progressive human rights protection in its provision on the relationship between the EUC and
the ECHR. The EUC allows itself to offer better protection for the individual than the ECHR, but
never lesser:”In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision
shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.” (EUC art. 52(3)).
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The above suggests that the ECtHR can ensure a progression towards better protection of the
rights on the ECHR over time. However, it also raises a question: How can progression towards
greater human rights protection be ensured in countries where the constitution does not include a
provision similar to art 52(3) in the EUC?
ECHRs power states
The rights of the ECHR should be incorporated in the legislative process and its administration since
the best protection of human rights is not to give remedy when they have already been violated, but
to not have them violated in the first place. Furthermore, art. 13 of the convention establishes that
the national authorities are to remedy if a right has been violated, and article 35 establishes that the
ECtHR will not review cases that have not already exhausted domestic remedies. This means that
on the judicial side, the states should also provide human rights protection themselves.
When ratifying the ECHR, states agree to ensure that their national legislation is compatible
with it and its case law. The ECHR does not demand a specific way to ensure compliance with the
convention as long as rights and freedoms are ensured. This means that incorporation of the text of
the convention into domestic law is neither demanded, nor in itself sufficient (Caligiuri, Andrea &
Nicola Napoletano 2010: 126).
Countries with newer constitutions often incorporate the convention as reference to a constitu-
tional rule (Caligiuri, Andrea & Nicola Napoletano 2010: 129) – a solution similar to the provision
in the EU Charter. However, from the ECHR’s perspective this is no different from the Dutch
solution of applying a monist approach to international law or the Danish solution of incorporating
the convention into ordinary law (LBK nr 750 af 19/10/1998). The convention is considered ratified
as long as the application of the convention by the legislative, executive, and judicial power ensures
the rights; a EUC style constitutional provision is not necessary.
Conclusion
The dynamic interpretation tradition of the ECtHR is a more complex instrument than its political
and academic critics would have us believe. It does not simply allow for ‘judge-made law’, but
works through a complex relationship between the principle of subsidiarity made applicable though
the margin of appreciation and the emerging consensus doctrine. It exists to further the movement
towards European unity and collective enforcement of the rights as prescribed in the preamble, and
with it the ECHR can deal with issues that did not exist or were unrecognised at the time of its
creation, including both technological and social developments.
The critique of the dynamic interpretation relies on a notion that the ECtHR is an inherently
non-democratic institution, because the judges are not democratically elected, and the ECtHR has
the power to declare democratically created policies to be human rights violations. This critique is,
however, based in a reductive understanding of democracy as majoritarian rule. Individual rights,
both in terms of historic and domestic citizens’ rights, and international human rights are designed
exactly to alleviate the pitfall of majoritarian rule in democracy. It is therefore a feature of the
dynamic interpretation doctrine that the margin of appreciation is appropriate in cases where the
political decisions affect the entire population, but not when majoritarian rule abuses minorities.
The SAS v France judgement from 2014 where the ECtHR ruled that it was within France’s margin
of appreciation to prohibit face-concealing clothing in public, although the prohibition affected
almost exclusively a religious minority, appears to go against this principle that the margin of
appreciation cannot be used when policies affect only a minority. The dissenting judges also
noted this (SAS v France 2014: Dissenting opinion by judges Bussberger and Jäderblom para 20).
Therefore, the use of the margin of appreciation doctrine in this case could be seen as a pragmatic
use rather than a normative use.
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In addition to the normative and legal arguments to consider, the ECtHR has to take its posi-
tion of power into account. This is the pragmatic argument for the margin of appreciation. If the
ECtHR makes judgements that are controversial enough in the member states that the member
states do not enforce them, it threatens the power of the ECtHR, which relies on the expectation of
state compliance. With the increasing number of events of non-compliance the ECtHR could well
be taking this into account.
This pragmatic view of the margin of appreciation is, however, problematic since the ECtHR
will also risk losing power if it does not consistently apply the ECHR or if it appears biased. The
margin of appreciation doctrine is thus not a way for the ECtHR to lie low in a period of populist
isolationism, and neither is a break with the dynamic interpretation doctrine, which has allowed the
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6. Human Rights in Global Value Chains
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Advancing Human Rights in Global Value Chains: The French
Legislation on Corporate Duty of Vigilance
Abstract
On 21 February 2017, the French Government enacted a legislation on corporate duty of vigilance,
as a means of addressing human rights abuses arising from transnational companies’ activities in
France and in foreign countries where they operate. This legislation also aims at providing victims
with effective access to remedies in these countries. Thanks to this legislation, France has been
the first country to make human rights due diligence mandatory in accordance with the United
Nations Guiding Principles. Although this standard is ambitious on many levels, the corporate
duty of vigilance is the product of the long consultation process which makes it a compromise
between conflicting corporate interests and victims’ rights. Therefore, this paper starts by analysing
the legislative process and political arguments that shaped the corporate duty of vigilance, and
explains how it impacted its final framework and scope. It demonstrates that on the one hand, the
holistic and extraterritorial dimension of the corporate duty of vigilance makes it an innovative
standard covering most of human rights abuses occurring in global value chains. However, the
disproportionate burden of proof on the claimant maintains a status quo for victims who still
have limited access to redress, and the absence of a deterrent sanction maintains transnational
corporations’ impunity for human rights abuses resulting from their activities overseas. Therefore,
the corporate duty of vigilance seems to have lost its practical value in the process and failed to
fulfil its initial goals to address human rights abuses in global value chains and provide victims
with effective remedies. However, this legislation should be seen as a first step towards businesses’
responsibility to respect human rights wherever they operate. Indeed, the legislation on corporate
duty of vigilance is just a first step for France that is expecting to gradually extend its scope, and
initiate a movement among its European neighbours leading to a human right due diligence standard
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at the European Union level.
Introduction
In April 2013, the collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh, used in the production of
clothes for large European and American brands, cost the lives of thousands of workers and left
victims without any means of compensation1. Following the incident, the French Government
initiated a legislative proposal2 aimed at addressing transnational corporations’ impunity for human
rights abuses occurring in their global value chains3. On 21 February 2017, the legislation on
corporate duty of vigilance and so-called ‘Rana Plaza legislation’, was finally adopted by the French
National Assembly, after four years of intense consultation4.
In its final version5, the legislation requires large French companies employing at least 5,000
persons in France, or at least 10,000 persons in France and abroad to set up and implement a so-
called “vigilance plan”6. This vigilance plan should comprise reasonable vigilance measures aimed
at identifying risks and preventing severe violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
health or security risks, and environmental damage, arising throughout global value chains7. With
the adoption of the legislation on corporate duty of vigilance, France is the first country in the
world to make human rights due diligence mandatory, and integrate the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)8 into its domestic legal framework. It provides
a legally binding value to businesses’ obligation to respect human rights (Pillar II of the UNGPs)9
in accordance with France’s own obligation to protect human rights (Pillar I of the UNGPs)10, while
providing victims of business-related human rights abuses with the legal means to access remedies
(Pillar III of the UNGPs)11. However, during the legislative process, the draft law faced criticism
by representatives of both companies and civil society organizations. Seen as a disproportionate
burden for French companies or as an insufficient commitment to protecting victims of economic
crimes by others, the draft law became hostage to opposing groups of stakeholders threatening its
final adoption12.
Therefore, we can wonder whether the current French legislation on corporate duty of vigilance
provides a useful basis for effectively addressing human rights abuses committed throughout global
1Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Auchan Lawsuit (re garment factories in Bangladesh) (August 27,
2014) <http://business-humanrights.org/en/auchan-lawsuit-re-garment-factories-in-bangladesh>.
2Proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Draft law
on the duty of vigilance for parent and ordering companies] 2013 (Assemblée Nationale [French National Assembly])
1524.
3United Nations, ’The corporate responsibility to respect human rights: An Interpretive Guide’ (2012), p.8: “A
business enterprise’s value chain encompasses the activities that convert input into output by adding value. It includes
entities with which it has a direct or indirect business relationship and which either (a) supply products or services that
contribute to the enterprise’s own products or services, or (b) receive products or services from the enterprise.”
4Proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre, texte
définitif [Draft law on the duty of vigilance for parent and ordering companies, final text] 2017 (Assemblée Nationale
[French National Assembly]), 924.
5This paper will mainly analyze the law on corporate duty of vigilance as in its final version adopted by the National
Assembly on 21 February 2017, prior to review by the Constitutional Court: See 4, Draft law, n. 924 (2017).
6See 4, Draft law n. 924 (2017), Article L.225-102-4.-I.
7See 4, Draft law n.924 (2017), Article L.225-102-4.-I.
8United Nations, ’Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect,
Respect and Remedy" Framework’ (2011) [UNGP].
9See note 8, UNGP (2011), Pillar I, pp. 3-4.
10See note 8, UNGP (2011), Pillar II, pp. 13-16.
11See note 8, UNGP (2011), Pillar III, pp. 27-28.
12More information at: Vanina Eckert, The French Attempt to Legalize Human Rights Due Diligence: Is France
Leading the European Union in Business and Human Rights?, October 2016, Lund University Publications Student
Papers, <http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/8893265>, 4.1, p.26-33.
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value chains, or whether it lost its practical legal value in the process.
First, this paper will highlight that despite the genesis of the corporate duty of vigilance being slow
and chaotic, the final adoption of this ambitious law has been a symbolic step forward in advancing
human rights in global value chains (I). Second, it will argue that despite its high moral value, the
effects of the corporate duty of vigilance may be limited in practice (II).
I. The Slow Genesis of an Ambitious Corporate Duty of Vigilance
The draft law on corporate duty of vigilance has faced many obstacles on its journey towards its
final adoption. Therefore, it is fundamental to be aware of the context and consultation process
under which the duty of vigilance was created (A), in order to understand the whole dimension and
framework of this innovative standard (B).
A. The Product of a Long Consultation Process
In June 2013, France launched a “CSR Platform” aimed at developing a large consultation process
involving representatives of businesses, trade unions, civil society organizations, and public institu-
tions, to build a pro-active, in-depth business and human rights plan13. In this context, the left-wing
parties within the National Assembly initiated a draft law14 with a wide duty of vigilance for French
companies, and a mechanism of presumption of liability in favor of victims. This mechanism was
very innovative as in case of damage, the company was presumed to have committed a fault. The
burden of proof was not on the claimant to prove the company’s liability, but on the company to
prove its innocence by showing that it had set up and effectively implemented a vigilance plan to
prevent adverse impacts on human rights. However, this first version of the duty of vigilance was
deemed imprecise and dangerous for businesses, with a risk of unlimited liability, and it failed to
be adopted by the National Assembly in 201315. The corporate duty of vigilance was jeopardized
by a divided National Assembly, where right-wing Members of Parliament representing corporate
interests tried to limit the scope of the duty and weaken corporate responsibility, while socialist,
ecologist, communist and some far-right Members of Parliament in favor of workers’ rights and
business regulation, focused on extending its scope and reducing victims’ burden of proof16. There-
fore, the corporate duty of vigilance’s first ambitions had to be lowered and the draft law redesigned
in order to find a compromise between conflicting interests of companies and victims and, in 2015,
the National Assembly agreed on a classical fault-based corporate liability with the burden of proof
on victims17. Subsequently, the draft law faced strong rejection by the Senate, whose right-wing
majority was strongly opposed to imposing another duty on the private sector18. The Senate tried to





14See 2, Draft law n. 1524 (2013).
15Assemblée Nationale [French National Assembly], 14th legislature, Report n. 2628, March 11, 2015 (Potier,
Dominique), II. B. 2 and 3, p.32-34.
16For more information about the obstacles and political arguments shaping the corporate duty of vigilance draft law:
See 12, Vanina Eckert, 2016, 4.1, p.26-33.
17Proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre adoptée
par l’Assemblée Nationale en première lecture [Draft law on the duty of vigilance for parent and ordering companies
adopted by the National Assembly in the first reading] 2015 (Assemblée Nationale [French National Assembly]) 501.
More details on the framework of the draft law in section I.B. below.
18Proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre texte rejeté
par le Sénat [Draft law on the duty of vigilance for parent and ordering companies text rejected by the Senate] 2015
(Sénat [French Senate]) n.40. Sénat [French Senate], Ordinary session of 2015-2016, Report n.74, October 14, 2015
(Frassa, Christophe-André), p.34-37.
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issue a “preliminary motion” aimed at blocking the legislative process within the French Parliament
until the European Union could take further legal initiatives on the matter19. This motion was
strongly criticized by other Members of Parliament and was abandoned by the Senate20. In 2016,
the Senate tried to replace the duty of vigilance with a non-financial reporting obligation, similar to
that of the EU Directive 2014/95/EU21. This version of the draft law would in effect have duplicated
an obligation that has existed under French law since 200122, and would have limited companies’
duties to a simple disclosure of their vigilance plan, without any requirement of implementation
or effects23. As the National Assembly and the Senate failed to reach an agreement on the terms
of the draft law, the last word was given to the National Assembly24, which finally adopted the
fault-based liability version of the corporate duty of vigilance on 21 February 201725.
As such, it took four years for the corporate duty of vigilance to emerge from this long and difficult
path towards a compromise solution. From a very ambitious mechanism with a presumption of
corporate liability, through a simple non-financial reporting obligation, to a classical fault-based
liability, the duty of vigilance has been stretched and redesigned in order to improve victims’ rights
without overloading businesses. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind the context and the
process under which the duty of vigilance was forged, to fully understand the current framework
and scope of this innovative standard (B).
B. An innovative standard with a holistic and extraterritorial scope
Contrary to other European human rights due diligence standards (e.g. the Modern Slavery Act in
the United Kingdom), the corporate duty of vigilance is the first human rights due diligence legal
standard with a holistic and extraterritorial scope.
Indeed, it covers most business and human rights issues, without distinction between types of com-
panies, types of damage or rights violated. As such, it applies to any company employing at least
5,000 persons, including their direct or indirect subsidiaries located in France, or those employing
at least 10,000 persons including their direct or indirect subsidiaries located in France and abroad.
Furthermore, the vigilance plan comprises the reasonable vigilance measures aimed at identifying
risks, and preventing severe violations of all human rights and fundamental freedoms without
distinction, as well as health or security risks, and environmental damage26. The duty of vigilance is
derived from classical French civil law reasoning, aimed at covering all kinds of damage. However,
to ensure that companies do not have unlimited liability, the latest version of the draft law includes
a list of measures that companies are expected to implement, such as risk assessments including
19Sénat [French Senate], Règlement du Sénat et instruction générale du bureau [Regulation of the Senate and general
instructions of the office], Article 44, para.4, <http://www.senat.fr/reglement/reglement_mono.html#toc123>.
20Sénat [French Senate], Ordinary session of 2015-2016, Report n.74, October 14, 2015 (Frassa, Christophe-André),
p.37-52. Assemblée Nationale [French National Assembly], 14th legislature, Report n.3582, March 16, 2016 (Potier,
Dominique), p.6.
21Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive
2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups
2014 (OJ L 330, 15.11.2014, p. 1–9).
22Law n.2001-420 of May 15, 2001 JORF [Official Gazette of France] n.113 of May 16, 2001 p.7776, text n. 2,
Article 116 creating a new Article L225-102-1 in the French Commercial Code.
23Proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Draft law
on the duty of vigilance for parent and ordering companies text] 13 October 2016 (Sénat [French Senate]) TA n.1.
24See the French legislative process with the last word given to the National Assembly in case of failure to find an
agreement between the National Assembly and the Senate: Sénat [French Senate], Proposition de loi relative au devoir
de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre: Les étapes de la discussion [Draft law on the duty
of vigilance for parent and ordering companies: the steps of the legislative procedure] <http://www.senat.fr/dossier-
legislatif/ppl14-376.html>.
25See 4, Draft law n.924 (2017).
26See 4, Draft law n.924 (2017), Article L.225-102-4.-I.
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mapping and mitigation processes, auditing, whistle-blower mechanisms, follow-ups, and reviews27.
Furthermore, one of the most innovative aspects of the corporate duty of vigilance is that the
vigilance plan should not only cover potential or actual negative impacts resulting from the com-
pany’s own activities. It should also include impacts resulting from the activities of directly or
indirectly controlled companies, and the subcontractors and suppliers with which it maintains
an ‘established commercial relationship’28. Therefore, in case damages occur abroad within a
French company’s global value chain, victims are entitled to seek remedies in France, where the
judge has extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute the French company for the adverse impacts
of its subsidiaries and subcontractors. This new feature is very innovative, as it allows judges to
overcome the legal barriers created by the principle of autonomy29, which traditionally grants legal
autonomy to each legal entity and prevents controlling companies from being held liable for another
company’s actions. Under the final draft law, if there is evidence that the company has not set up or
effectively implemented its vigilance plan, it may receive a formal notice and a judicial injunction
to fulfil its obligations and prevent further damage. If the company refuses to comply with its duty
of vigilance or the judicial injunction, it may be held liable and be ordered to pay compensation
to victims30. Under the final draft law, it could also be sanctioned with a civil fine of up to 10
million euros31, with a possible multiplication by up to three (30 million euros) depending on the
circumstances and the severity of the violation32.
Thus, the draft law on duty of vigilance opened a new era for mandatory human rights due dili-
gence, covering all potential human rights abuses occurring in global value chains, and extending
extraterritorially, in line with the UNGPs. However, if the corporate duty of vigilance is ambitious
and innovative in theory, a more-in-depth study of its framework highlights that its effects may be
limited in practice (II).
II. The Limited Practical Effects of the Corporate Duty of Vigilance
Contrary to the 2013 version of the duty of vigilance with a presumption of liability in favor of
victims, the final version of the corporate duty of vigilance may have limited practical effects for
victims. Indeed, the high burden of proof on the claimant still constitutes a barrier to victims’
access to remedies (A). Furthermore, the fine, which was a deterrent and symbolic sanction in case
of corporate liability, had to be abandoned on the grounds that it was unconstitutional (B).
A. A Disproportionate Burden of Proof on Victims
The last version of the duty of vigilance set up a high burden of proof on the victim. Indeed, to
hold a company liable, the claimant will have to prove three elements: (1) the fact that the com-
pany committed a fault by not setting up and effectively implementing its vigilance plan; (2) that
damage(s) occurred; and (3) causality, i.e. the link between the fault and damage(s). However, it is
very unlikely that victims working for a subsidiary or subcontractor in a developing country would
have the means and capability to investigate or access the French parent or ordering company’s
records to prove that it did not have a vigilance plan. As mentioned previously, this capability gap
was initially addressed by the 2013 draft law, which provided for a presumption of fault laying
the burden of proof on the company, but this mechanism was replaced by a classical fault-based
liability in the 2015 version of the draft law. Moreover, the link between the fault and the damage(s)
27See 4, Draft law n.924 (2017), Article L.225-102-4.-I, 1-5.
28See 4, Draft law n.924 (2017), Article L.225-102-4.-I.
29Code civil [French Civil Code], (2016), Article 1842
30See 4, Draft law n.924 (2017), Article L.225-102-5.
31See 4, Draft law n.924 (2017), Article L.225-102-4.-II.
32See 12, Vanina Eckert, 2016, 4.2, p.36-50.
56 Chapter 6. Advancing Human Rights in Global Value Chains
is a difficult element to prove for claimants and constitutes an additional limitation on a company’s
liability and victims’ access to remedies. Thus, for French civil society organizations, the latest
version of the duty of vigilance is just an “upgraded non-financial reporting obligation”, as its
effects are limited to a corporate duty to disclose vigilance procedures, without effective liability in
case it failed to implement them33.
Finally, the draft law also has limited effects since the burden of proof concerning the extraterritorial
application of the law and extraterritorial jurisdiction of the French judge remains on the victims.
Indeed, in case damage(s) occurred in relation to the activities of a French company’s subsidiary
or subcontractor located abroad, the person bringing a claim before a French court or tribunal
will have to provide evidence that there is a close connection between the activities of the foreign
subsidiary or subcontractor, and the French company34. The claimant will have to prove that the
French company directly or indirectly controlled the entity responsible for the damage(s), or that
they maintained sustainable commercial relationships, justifying that the vigilance plan should have
covered the risks arising from this entity’s activities. Moreover, in order to ensure that the French
law on corporate duty of vigilance prevails over the law of the jurisdiction where the damage(s)
occurred, the claimant will have to prove that it is clear from the circumstances of the case that the
abuse is manifestly more closely connected with France35. The claimant can do so by referring to
orders and directives from French company to the entity under its control (or its supplier) before
the damage(s) occurred36.
Therefore, the burden of proof on the claimant seems to be disproportionate in regard to his/her
means and resources in comparison to a transnational corporation. For many stakeholders, this
law of symbolic value appears more like an illusion reinforcing the status quo for victims’ limited
access to remedies more than it addresses it37. Furthermore, the high financial sanction, which was
one of the key elements of the mandatory corporate duty of vigilance, had to be removed from the
legislation on the grounds that it was unconstitutional (B).
B. A Deterrent Fine Sanctioned by the Constitutional Court
Two days after the final adoption of the draft law, the opponents of the corporate duty of vigilance
challenged its constitutionality before the French Constitutional Court. They argued that the new
duty of vigilance was contrary to the freedom of entrepreneurship38, as it forced companies to
disclose confidential information39, and violated the principle of legality40, as the imprecise frame-
work of the duty did not allow companies to foresee their liability41. On 23 March, the French
Constitutional Court decided that the draft law on corporate duty of vigilance did not violate the
freedom of entrepreneurship42, but found that it was partially unconstitutional as contrary to the
33Cossart, Sandra and Marie-Laure Guislain, ’Le devoir de vigilance pour les entreprises multinationales, un impératif
juridique pour une économie durable, Pourquoi le raisonnement juridique ne peut pas constituer un obstacle aux choix
politiques [The duty of vigilance for multinationals, a legal imperative for a sustainable economy, Why the legal reasoning
cannot constitute an obstacle to the political choices]’ [75] (2015) RLDA 2015/104 Revue Lamy Droit des Affaires
Repères n. 5587, p.77. See 12, Vanina Eckert, 2016, 4.3.2, p.56-57.
34Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 2012 (OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1–32),
Article 8.1.
35Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) 2007 (OJ L 199, 31.7.2007), Article 4.3.
36More information on the extraterritorial dimension of the law at: See 12, Vanina Eckert, 2016, 4.2.1.3, p.42-46.
37See 33, Cossart, Sandra and Marie-Laure Guislain, 2015, p.77.
38Declaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen [Declaration on the Right of Man and Citizen] 1789, Article 4.
39Conseil Constitutionnel [French Constitutional Council], decision no. 2017-750 DC, March 23, 2017, para.15.
40Declaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen [Declaration on the Right of Man and Citizen] 1789, Article 8.
41See 39, French Constitutional Council, 2017, para. 5.
42No violation of freedom of enterpreneurship because its limitations were not disproportionate in regard to the general
interest it served, and because the duty of vigilance do not impose on companies to disclose confidential information
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principle of legality43.
The Constitutional Court decided that the corporate duty of vigilance was too general and imprecise
to justify a heavy sanction, such as a 10 million euros fine44. Indeed, according to the constitutional
judges, the concept of “reasonable measures of vigilance”, as well as the specific measures listed in
the first article of the draft law45, are not clearly defined and are too broad for companies to precisely
know what their duties are46. The fact that these measures can be framed later by a decree does not
make it less uncertain for companies. Moreover, the corporate duty of vigilance embraces potential
violations of all human rights and freedoms without distinction47. These violations can arise from
activities of all business partners, which comprises all entities directly or indirectly controlled by
the main company, and all the subcontractors and suppliers with whom it “maintains sustainable
commercial relationships”48. However, this notion of “sustainable commercial relationships” comes
with no definition in the draft law, and does not distinguish between companies’ size, activities, or
sector49. Finally, the draft law did not specify whether the fine would apply to each violation or as
a blanket sanction covering multiple violations.
Thus, the 10 million euro fine was deemed too high and incompatible with the holistic and general
dimension of the corporate duty of vigilance according to the principle of legality. This sanction,
which was the symbolic and deterrent element of the corporate duty of vigilance, was considered
unconstitutional and was removed from the text of the draft law. As a consequence, the draft law
on corporate duty of vigilance was finally enacted on 28 March 2017, without any guidance on how
liable companies should be sanctioned50.
Conclusion
This paper shows that the framework and scope of the corporate duty of vigilance is the product
of a long path towards a compromise between the protection of victims’ rights and corporate
interests. On the one hand, its holistic and extraterritorial dimension makes the corporate duty of
vigilance an innovative and ambitious standard, aimed at covering most of the human rights abuses
resulting from transnational corporations’ activities in France and overseas. On the other hand,
the disproportionate burden of proof on the claimant maintains a status quo for victims who still
have a limited access to remedies. The absence of a deterrent sanction once a company is held
liable also strengthens transnational corporations’ impunity for human rights violations resulting
from the activities of their subsidiaries and subcontractors abroad. Also ironic is the fact that
following its entry into force, the so-called ‘Rana Plaza legislation’ only covers 125 companies
falling over the threshold of 5,000 employees in France or 10, 000 employees in France and abroad,
and excludes from its scope the companies involved in the Rana Plaza incident. Therefore, if the
duty of vigilance is a theoretically ambitious standard, it seems to have lost its practical value in
the process, and to have failed to fulfil its initial goals of combating transnational corporations’
impunity and improving victims’ access to remedies.
However, this law also constitutes the new basis for further development towards corporate liability
for human rights violations occurring throughout global value chains. Although the corporate duty
of vigilance has a limited practical value, it constitutes a symbolic step forward for mandatory
human rights due diligence in line with the UNGPs. Furthermore, the corporate duty of vigilance is
about their industrial and commercial strategy: See 39, French Constitutional Council, 2017, para.15-19.
43See 39, French Constitutional Council, 2017, para.5-13.
44See 39, French Constitutional Council, 2017, para.13.
45See 4, Draft law n.924 (2017), Article L.225-102-4.-I, 1-5.
46See 39, French Constitutional Council, 2017, para.9.
47See 39, French Constitutional Council, 2017, para.10.
48See 4, Draft law n.924 (2017), Article L.225-102-4.-I.
49See 39, French Constitutional Council, 2017, para.11
50Act n.2017-399 of March 23, 2017 JORF [Official Gazette of France] n.0074 March 28, 2017, text n. 1
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only a first experience standard intended to be gradually extended to a larger number of companies
in the long term, following the example of the non-financial reporting obligation created in France
in 200151. Moreover, it is also judges’ role to develop jurisprudence in this young field, and
extend the practical effects of the corporate duty of vigilance by applying an expansive original
intent-based method of interpretation in line with the initial spirit of the legislation. The duty of
vigilance also establishes a precedent aimed at catalysing similar initiatives among other European
countries. While working on the final adoption of the legislation on corporate duty of vigilance,
France has intensified its lobbying efforts to encourage initiatives to make human rights due dili-
gence mandatory at the EU level52. By doing so, France is expecting to recall the precedent of the
non-financial reporting obligation - which was adopted in 2001 within the French Parliament53 and
became an EU Directive more than a decade later54 - and impose itself as a forerunner for business
and human rights in Europe55.
51See 12, Vanina Eckert, 2016, 5.1.2, p.62-64.
52Read about Daniel Auroi’s Green Card to the European Commission on 18th May 2016 and France’s lobbying
efforts for mandatory human rights due diligence in the EU at : See 12, Vanina Eckert, 2016, 5.2.2., p.68-69.
53Law n.2001-420 of May 15, 2001 JORF [Official Gazette of France] n.113 of May 16, 2001 p.7776, text n. 2,
Article 116 creating a new Article L225-102-1 in the French Commercial Code.
54Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive
2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups
2014 (OJ L 330, 15.11.2014, p. 1–9). Read more at: See 12, Vanina Eckert, 2016, 5.1.2, p.62-65.
55See 12, Vanina Eckert, 2016, 5., p.58-69.
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7. Interview: Homo-nationalism
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ing
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Alexander: Would you like to tell me a little bit about the general idea of your research on homo-
nationalism?
Michael: What I found very interesting when I started doing research on homosexual rights and
homosexual identity, and also what really intrigued me while I did my research, was the shift that
has happened during the last 20 years in the ways homosexuality or gay people are framed in
political discourses and in popular culture. I started my research around 2010, about ten years after
9/11 and after the government of Anders Fogh (during which there was a lot of regulation regarding
LGBT rights, especially related to homosexual rights). I was interested in this new framing of gay
rights. So, one of the first analysis I made was to compare or to juxtapose the political parliamentary
proceedings in the late 1980s about registered partnership to the parliamentary proceedings in the
2000s about equality between registered partnership and straight marriage. In the 2000s, there was
a big change from the way in which homosexuality was spoken about in the discussions and in the
parliamentary proceedings about registered partnership in the 1980s. In the 1980s, homosexuals,
and especially homosexual men, were framed as some poor, sick persons whom the state should
take care of. Though this was a period where there was a big focus on and fear of AIDS, it still
struck me that the ways in which people talked about homosexuality was for contemporary eyes or
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ears a very homophobic discourse. Registered partnership was introduced as law under the promise,
and with politicians repeatedly stating, that registered partnership was in no way equal to making a
family or entering marriage. Many politicians were really afraid that the introduction of registered
partnership would damage Denmark’s reputation within the Nordic countries and Europe. So one
of the rules that were introduced required that both partners were Danish citizens or had lived in
Denmark for two years, so people wouldn’t come and get married in Denmark. When you compare
this to the discussions and the parliamentary proceedings in the 2000s it was quite a different frame.
Firstly, there were around 1-3 legislative proposals a year from 2000 and up to 2013, meaning
that the topic was present on the political agenda. And secondly, what really was the big change
was that the perception of the homosexual person changed from being seen as a poor thing, to
being seen as a person who could and should have rights: A citizen. However, it was really hard
to pass the legislation because the right wing government and The Danish People’s Party (Dansk
Folkeparti) opposed to a lot of the proposals. But slowly in the beginning and increasingly over
the years, these questions were framed differently in relation to the question of nationality. Gay
rights became increasingly related to Danish values, as something that we in Denmark should be
proud of. This nationalist framing of homosexual rights is of course used by the left wing parties
proposing the law. But it is also used by the parties who are not in favor. They will state something
like “in Denmark everyone has the right to live according to the sexuality they want to, and we
should be proud of that, as this is something that is really special to Denmark”, but still they oppose
it for some reason. The discussion of gay rights in Denmark was part of three different kinds of
law complexes; the discussions about lesbians and single women’s access to medically assisted
reproduction, the legislation about adoption and the legislation about gay marriage. And in all
three we have all these different proposals so that we have almost a proposal about each of these
legal issues every year. It became harder and harder for those who opposed gay rights to find good
arguments because if it was a special Danish value that homosexuals were full citizens, then why
should they not have the same rights? So in the end, apart from the very Christian spokespersons
from The Danish People’s Party, it became harder and harder for them to find any good arguments
to oppose these changes in legislation. So these very Christian members like Langballe and Krarup1
became the only ones who held on to the idea that it is a Danish value that the family is a man
and a woman and that it has been like that forever. The rest ended up in these legal-bureaucratic
arguments that it would be so difficult to change this law because then we have to change The
Children’s Law, the adoption law and we have to make collateral agreements and we cannot manage
it. In the end, in all three discussions – lesbian and single women’s access to medically assisted
reproduction, foreign child adoption and marriage – the laws were passed because of minority votes
in Venstre and Konservative Party. So a big change in perception became evident during the 2000s
when homosexuals stopped being seen as a poor, sick person to become a full citizen who should
have rights.
And then, there is a different framing of the nation state’s relation to homosexuality. It is no
new thing that the nation state builds its own story also in relation to its citizens’ relationship
to sexuality. But it seems that homosexuality went from being something that was not Danish,
to becoming a core Danish value in these discussions. And you see similar things happening in
The Netherlands, in Germany, in the US in different ways. I interpret this new framing of the
homosexual within the nation as related to or somehow reflecting the new political order starting in
the 1990s, but being fixed even more by 9/11. In the late 1990s there was a rise of anti-immigration
rhetoric in Europe and from 9/11, a new global geopolitical order. So within Bush’ rhetoric there
were “those who are with us and those who are against us”, meaning that those who are against
us are not in favor of democracy, the free and modern world, and they are also traditionalist and
religious fundamentalist. And this new global structure and its ideology seem to relate to how the
1Jesper Langballe and Søren Krarup, former members of Parliament for The Danish People’s Party (ed.)
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nation state embeds homosexuality. By using homosexuality you can juxtapose the nation against
those who are then framed as being not in favor of homosexuality. Homosexual figures were a
symbol of modernism and urbanism and progress, new ways of doing family, new ways of being a
human, new ways of organizing aesthetics and stuff like that. So the homosexual figure becomes
this symbol of modernism which then works to frame the Danish state as more modern, but at
the same time it reflects an image of this imaginary or real enemy who does not favor homosexu-
ality. So homosexuality became this demarcating figure between the nation and the nation’s “Other”.
Alexander: And the “Other” being the Muslim World at the time?
Michael: Yes, the “Other” being what we termed ”the Muslim World”. So these kinds of polit-
ical constructions and these kinds of imageries of the political construction are also producing
fixed imageries of the nation. This is a more orientalist understanding producing ”the Other” or
”the Muslim World” as an idea. And it became quite obvious that homosexuality was used as a
demarcating figure in the 2000s if you look at different ways the homosexual emerge in relation
to the state’s material about immigration. For instance if a person applies for Danish citizenship
or permanent residency he or she needs to take a test to pass not only Danish language, but also
Danish culture and Danish ideas. And as part of this test the Ministry of Immigration gives out this
DVD where people can learn about Danish values, Danish democracy, Danish history, whatever,
and in this video – I think it was introduced in 2010 in Denmark and a little earlier in Holland –
you put in homosexuality as something that the immigrant has to learn in order to become Danish
and learn about Danish culture. In the Danish video you see two gay men walking into a gay bar
holding hands and discussing life and it’s very calm. But what is really interesting is that the voice
over assumes that the listener, who is the immigrant, has never heard about homosexuality before.
And if he or she has heard about it, then he or she definitely opposes it. So you have this very
heteronormative understanding of the immigrant as always already heterosexual and supposedly
homophobic. And then on the other hand there is the construction of Danishness in which homo-
sexual people can hold hands. Since it was just before the introduction of same sex marriage, they
couldn’t say that homosexual people could get married, but they could get registered, which is
almost the same as marriage. In this way homosexuality becomes this demarcating figure. On the
one hand it becomes the symbol of what Danishness is, and what Danishness is not on the other. So
there is Danishness understood as homosexuality quite literally embedded within Denmark (and not
as in the 1980s when homosexuality was embedded outside Denmark, as something that wasn’t in
the core of Denmark). Secondly, it becomes something that the immigrant has to accept in order to
become Danish. So in order to become a full Dane and citizen you have to like gay people. You see
the same in Germany where this kind of figure of course also emerges or pops up within different
kinds of political framing and rhetoric.
Alexander: I think it is very interesting – the idea of this being a part of whichever geopolitical
structures which are in the world at the time. Because I still think we are experiencing in the current
political discourse that the whole figure of Danishness and Muslim immigrant is something where
homosexuality is Danish, while Muslim immigrant communities are framed as homophobic. And
therefore we need to teach immigrants to respect certain rights in order for them to become Danish.
But at the same time we have seen sort of the same figure in regards to Christian countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa and Russia, for example, which does not have anything to do with the relation
between Christianity and Islam.
Michael: Yes, I don’t think it’s about Muslimness or Danishness or democracy or something like
that. I think it’s a question of political framing , just like the case with Sub-Saharan African
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countries and Denmark, which then portrays or reflects an understanding of these countries as
traditional, in Danish political discourse you would often say ”medieval” and Denmark is modern.
And you can say the same about Russia, right? And in many of these countries being gay-friendly
is then turned into a question of being pro-West, so here is kind of the flipside of the coin, where
countries use the gay figure as something that marks what is outside of the nation as something
that the nation should not respect. So the homosexual figure becomes a symbol or a way of doing
nation building.
Alexander: That’s very interesting, because that might also explain why this hasn’t been used to
divide for example Denmark and the United States although we actually have a fairly big difference
in the level of protection of gay rights and that gay people in the United States have actually been
fighting to get some of the same rights that we have here, but we haven’t used it in the same way.
Michael: I think to some extent there is this global North-West discourse which relates West-
European countries to the US as some kind of alliance. I have been analyzing the rhetoric in
Denmark and in Norway, and in these rhetoric is found what I and some co-researchers have tried
to think of as this kind of exceptionalist logic, in which Denmark and in Norway have this little,
little fragile democracy and that proves to be the frontier of the world in relation to gay rights.
So in Denmark there seems to be this logical coherence between gay rights, rights of abortion,
women’s rights and pornography. So, in the Danish discussions you hear people say something like
“Denmark was the first to introduce free visual porn, the first really early on to legalize abortion,
in the forefront with women’s rights, in the forefront with gay rights and the first to introduce
registered partnership”. So this is a very special unique country, right? And we’re kind of caught
between the South and the power of the traditionalist religious US, the puritanical US, where you
can’t show your boobs on Facebook or whatever. This kind of exceptionalist discourse creates a
kind of state of emergency. So you have to really protect this fragile highly modern democracy.
And this I wouldn’t say one-to-one justifies, but kind of works as an argument to legitimize the
closing of Denmark to immigrants, to promote the national identify because it’s so fragile, because
it’s very exceptional in the world, because there is this push from both the US and the South. And I
think in political debates the logic is very much against the Muslim world and to a lesser extend
the African and the Russian world, and to an even lesser extend the US. But you have this kind of
nation building in relation to these different kinds of otherness, including the US.
Alexander: If I can stop you at nation building and go on to Europe. Because Europe is very much
something we are building as well in terms of identities and in terms of structures and everything
else. Do you think that gay rights play a role in that construction too and in what way?
Michael: I don’t know enough about European identity. . . But what strikes me is that it seems
to divide – at least in a Danish imagery – what is understood as West European countries and
East European countries. So if you look at a country like Poland and the Catholic and pro-family
dominant rhetoric in Poland, it’s very hard to be a queer family or person. And it seems like these
pro-family formations are related to opposing the integration into EU. So kind of a level up of
national identity as opposing to Europe, which came to oppose a lot of things, but also included
an increased class-difference or stratification of the Polish society. And in Denmark there is a
discourse of Eastern Europeans as being more backwards than the West Europeans and you have
the same kind of logic with the gay figure as being something that opposes that. So in that way I
see how the gay figure plays into Western/Eastern national identities. But at the same time I think
it’s much more complicated. If you look at the introduction of gay marriage and gay rights to create
families in France, we have a different picture than you have in places like Holland and to some
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extend Germany, the UK and Scandinavian countries. And then you could say you have a division
between the Catholic south and the Protestant north, but then you have a quite different story in
Spain which was one of the first countries in Europe to introduce gay marriage. So I think there are
two levels in this; there is the level of how gay rights are introduced in the local political economy,
and the level of how gay rights are made into political questions. And there seems to be very big
differences on the level of policy. The big difference is between the countries’ policies in many
ways, in both East and West and South and North of Europe. But on a more political imagery level
it seems to play a role in the discourses where there is this kind of democratic, modern West, there’s
the backward East. And in that question women’s rights and gay rights seem to play important
symbolic roles in these constructions.
Alexander: Okay, then I think I will move on to the so-called refugee crisis and the challenge of
migration to Europe. How do gay rights or LGBT rights, which one you prefer to focus on, play a
role in how countries deal with refugees?
Michael: It doesn’t I would say. But what I think is interesting is that there are these kinds of
moral panics about the refugees entering Europa. And there are these kinds of discourses about
refugees – you talked about the refugee crisis and you have the image of the floods of refugees,
and you have these metaphorical discourses about huge floods of people coming. And within this
kind of metaphorical framing of immigration there are these moral panics in Germany about the
New Year’s Eve2, or the incident on Funen, Denmark, where a group of kids or young men from a
refugee center had allegedly molested young women at a music festival. They were never convicted
for that, but there were some accusations. So that is a common discourse about the refugees. And I
think that within a nationalist discourse, the nation is perceived as being under attack or under a
tsunami of refugees flowing in. The nation is being hurt, and that harm is seen through the figure of
the young woman or the woman and the gay person, who are these fragile persons. I of course do
not agree with this kind of rhetoric, I think it is a rhetoric and not reality. But it does the same thing
that we talked about before, it assumes that homosexuality is within the nation, and that women
and fragile people within the nation state are threatened by people from the South. So you don’t
talk about LGBTQ refugees, they kind of don’t exist in the political imagery because refugees are
straight people, they are straight men that are coming, right?
Alexander: But at the same time we have people fleeing actually because they are persecuted for
their LGBT identity so what issues do you see there? As far as I remember you have proposed
at some point to include asylum in the discussion of these countries that have made some very
suppressive laws like Russia did, Tsjetsjenia and countries like Nigeria and Uganda?
Michael: So you have a lot of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and from Middle Eastern
countries who are coming to Europe because they are LGBTQ and cannot live in their country of
origin, that is Iran, Afghanistan, Iran, Uganda, Cameroon which are the most prominent places
where it’s most difficult to be LGBTQ. But we also have refugees fleeing to Denmark because
of their gender identity and sexual orientation from countries like Pakistan, Egypt, Belarus, all
over the world. And what we proposed, me and Mads Drud3 in that article about Russia, was that
when the Danish officials and politicians criticized the ways in which Russian politics or Russian
2New Year’s Eve 2015, around 80-90 women reported “being robbed, threatened or sexually molested at New
Year celebrations outside Cologne’s cathedral by young, mostly drunk, men” (Chambers, Madeleine (2016): “Ger-
mans shaken by New Year attacks on women in Cologne”, Reuters, January 5, 2016 (accessed May 21, 2018 at
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-assaults-idUSKBN0UJ1IP20160105)) (ed.)
3Mads Ted-Drud Jensen, Sociologist and Senior Adviser at Centre for Vulnerable Refugees (Center for Udsatte
Flygtninge) (ed.)
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law relates to homosexuality – this was after the propaganda law in Russia. So there were a lot
of politicians who were making statements that this is too bad, and we have to stop that and so
on. And what we proposed here in Denmark was that we could make it easy for people who lived
there, LGBTQ people who lived there, to come to Denmark, get asylum, and that would be a way
to counter that kind of thing. And I think to a lesser degree I would, and I still think that, argue the
same in relation to other countries. Because if you love someone as a gay person in Teheran or
Kabul or in Kampala there is no way for you to come to Denmark. It’s impossible for young men
in Kampala to get a visa to Denmark without a family, so the only way for you to get to Denmark is
by crossing the Mediterranean Sea and walking or taking the train up to Denmark. So if the Danish
state or if Danish politicians really want to help LGBTQ people in Kampala, in Uganda, and not
just through words pulled out of the hat at the Pride or something, then you could make it possible
for people to apply for asylum from Kampala or to come to Denmark based on the gender identity
or sexual orientation and promise them asylum. But this isn’t the case, I mean people from Uganda
do not get asylum in Denmark.
Alexander: So just to tie it in with what we discussed in the beginning, so your point is that if
a country such as Denmark wants to portray itself as a country which is leading the way and
progressive compared to countries which are doing what Russia or other countries do, then the
government should act on it by including asylum?
Michael: Yes exactly. And I think that this example shows that some of the hollowness of homona-
tionalist discourse or homonational politics is that it’s a very specific way of being gay friendly
that emerges. I mean it isn’t questioning heteronormativity, it isn’t really in this case opening the
borders for LGBTQ refugees, Rather, it seems to be this rhetoric and some kind of free speech that
you can use to articulate your national identity without really changing your policies.
Alexander: That brings me to the next question because the article that we just discussed was more
of an opinion piece, a debate piece, compared to your research I assume. How do you think your
work as a researcher plays together with that sort of activism if we can use that term? Are they
connected in any way?
Michael: I don’t know. I think that especially that Russian piece is easier, but they are not connected.
I think that is me making an opinion informed by whatever I know, because I haven’t studied the
Russian/Danish context. I think it’s more difficult when the borders between what is academic
work and what is politics becomes more blurred when I discuss my own research, make opinion
pieces about my own research.
Alexander: Okay, but you are also involved in LGBT asylum which is an NGO. Does that have
anything to do with what motivates you as a researcher? Maybe I can put it that way.
Michael: Yeah, it does. And I think about the connection between that kind of work and my
research work, in two ways. I actually see it as my duty and my responsibility as a state sponsored
researcher, I’m obliged, I’m supposed to communicate my research to the outside world. So I do
that by talking to journalists, writing pieces that are not in academic journals. But I also think that
as a researcher who works with these kinds of more, I wouldn’t say political, but questions relating
to people’s lives, I have an obligation to put that research and that knowledge into some kind of
function within the civil society and everyday life of people. So I prioritize a lot to do talks and do
workshops among LGBTQ organizations and I also think my work within LGBT Asylum, some of
it, is taking some of the knowledge I have from my research into the civil society. So that is kind of
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educating both the NGO, but also the people we are working with in the NGO, the immigration
authorities about the specificities about the LGBTQ identity.
Alexander: And what about the other way around, do you think being explicitly political makes a
difference in terms of your academic credibility?
Michael: Yes, I think that was what I was talking about before when you asked the question. I think
it’s important not to be political in my research. So I try to do my research based on methodological
and theoretical standards and not to give a kind of political answer but try to keep that out of it. At
the same time I think that doing research is also about making the world a better place. I think most
researchers want to do that. I mean if it’s medicine, you would take that for granted, right, you
take it for granted that the research was supposed to make people live longer, healthier, without
pain, whatever. But I also think that as a cultural studies researcher that one of our obligations is
that our research relates to the world in order to make it a better place, whatever that means. So I
feel obligated to kind of take these questions of nationalism, questions of immigration, questions
of what Danishness is, questions of rights and citizenship into my research and base questions on
these things. And what I try really hard to do is not to know the answer to the questions, in advance.
